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Abstract

In an age of privatization of many governmental functions such as health care, prison management, and
warfare, this Article poses the question as to whether eminent domain should be among them. Unlike other
privatized functions, eminent domain is a traditionally governmental and highly coercive power, akin to the
government’s power to tax, to arrest individuals, and to license. It is, therefore, a very public power.
In particular, the delegation of this very public power to private, non-profit and charitable corporations has
escaped the scrutiny that for-profit private actors have attracted in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Kelo. Though delegated the very public power of eminent domain, these private, non-profit actors
may only be accountable to their private boards of directors instead of to the general electorate.
This Article asserts that the largely procedural due process underpinnings of the Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine (PNDD), a doctrine that has enjoyed renewed vigor in the state courts, provides an excellent means
to assess the delegation of the takings power to private, non-profit corporations. The paper introduces two
PNDD tests and applies these tests to two case studies in which eminent domain power has been delegated to
private non-profits. Finally, in order to address the procedural due process concerns stressed by the PNDD
and the two judicial tests, this Article proposes seven legislative solutions, including the use of Social Capital
Impact Assessments, for state legislatures that have either delegated the takings power to private, non-profits,
or that are contemplating these delegations.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that federal and state governments increasingly
contract out a number of responsibilities and functions to private
1
2
3
parties, from prison management to health care to warfare. It is
1. See David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815, 818 (1987) (“Private for-profit firms now operate
approximately two dozen major facilities, including at least three medium or
maximum security adult correctional institutions.”); see also Ira P. Robbins, The Impact
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fathomable that almost any governmental function could be
4
outsourced to a private party. However, should eminent domain,
5
often viewed as the most public of powers, be among them?
This question fundamentally arises when the takings power is
transferred or delegated to private, non-profit or charitable
corporations that are unelected by the people, unappointed by a
6
public official, and not employed by government.
A lack of
accountability by these private delegates of the takings power serves
to increase the potential for abuse of this public power, stemming
from the conflicting interests of the private delegate and the public.
7
In the wake of Kelo v. City of New London, for-profit private entities
have garnered the most attention from legislators and the public,
given the benefits that may accrue to them when government uses
8
9
takings as part of an “integrated” or “comprehensive” economic
of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 911-12 (1988)
(noting that prison overcrowding is “pervasive” and that privatizing correctional
facilities has been proposed to reduce the overcrowding problem).
2. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
552 (2000) (stating that “[i]n the last half century, the private nonprofit sector has
become the primary mechanism for delivering government-financed human services,
such as health care”). In addition, the Article goes on to note that outside of health
care, local governments have also contracted out their waste management and
highway construction services. Id.
3. See Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29. (“Private
gunmen . . . are now guarding four U.S. generals . . . .[a]nd throughout Iraq, the
defense of essential military sites like depots of captured munitions has been
informally shared by private soldiers and U.S. troops. If the 25,000 figure is accurate,
the [private] businesses add about 16 percent to the coalition’s total forces.”).
4. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647,
647-48 (1986) (noting that “almost any power or function exercised by a
government, particularly a state or local government, can also be exercised,
unremarked, by some clearly private actor”).
5. See id. at 648 (“Accepting some fuzziness at the edges, we do recognize
certain powers as essentially governmental: rulemaking, adjudication of rights,
seizure of person or property, licensing and taxation. These powers share the element of
coercion, of making someone do something he does not choose to do or preventing
him from doing what he wishes to do.”) (emphasis added); see also Louis L. Jaffe, An
Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 586 (1947) (“It is
when delegated power affects the use of real property or the practice of a profession
that the judicial nerve tingles.”).
6. See Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,
469 (Tex. 1994) (stating that “[m]ore fundamentally, the basic concept of
democratic rule under a republican form of government is compromised when
public powers are abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people,
appointed by a public official or entity, nor employed by the government.”).
7. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice O’Connor authored a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice
Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, and Justice Thomas filed a separate
dissenting opinion.
8. Id. at 2666-67.
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development plan. These plans may provide revenue expansion to
for-profit corporations, but also to the public in the form of increased
property and sales tax revenues and additional jobs. Despite all the
attention that Kelo generated towards the part played by for-profit
corporations in the eminent domain arena, private non-profit and
charitable corporations, that have been delegated the takings power
by state legislatures, have managed to slip under the public’s and
lawmakers’ eminent domain radar screens. These non-profit entities
have generally evaded the sort of scrutiny and detection that not only
government, but also private for-profit corporations that may exercise
10
significant influence upon government in takings, have historically
attracted as a matter of course. When eminent domain is delegated
to private non-profit and charitable corporations, stricter scrutiny of
these delegations is often warranted, given the conflicting interests
between the private delegate and the public that might lead to
abusive exercises of the power.
As a preliminary matter, this Article will use the term “private, nonprofit corporations” as a global term for non-profit and charitable
corporations, as well as for charitable organizations and urban
redevelopment corporations. The common link in the nomenclature
is that these corporations are largely organized for a purpose outside
of engendering profits for shareholders. Their purpose is geared
11
towards charitable or benevolent aims. Secondly, these corporations
12
are largely entitled to favorable tax treatment.
9. Id. at 2668.
10. See, e.g., regarding Kelo and the residents in New London, Ted Mann, Pfizer’s
Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1, Jane Ellen Dee, Oh,
Claire You’re a Scholar and a Visionary . . . If Only You Could Quit Leaving Skin on the
Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5; see also Barry Yeoman, Whose House
Is It Anyway?, AARP Mag. Online, Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.aarpmagazine.org/
money/whose_house_is_it_anyway.html (discussing the outcry against the City of
New London and Pfizer Corporation upon the city’s decision to use eminent domain
to acquire parcels of land in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood). Another infamous
example is found in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that allowed the city of
Detroit to take land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General
Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto plant because the public benefits
promised by the plant were substantial); see also Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking
New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1837, 1868 (2005) (discussing that residents in Poletown banded together to form
the Poletown Neighborhood Council to contest the takings and noting that, in Kelo,
property owners who opposed the takings organized to file a lawsuit).
11. For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a non-profit corporation as “a
corporation organized for some purpose other than making a profit, and usually
afforded special tax treatment—[a]lso termed not-for-profit corporation.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 343 (7th ed. 1999). In addition, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
charitable corporation as “[a] nonprofit corporation that is dedicated to benevolent
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This Article will assert that the problem of unaccountable
delegations of eminent domain power to private non-profit and
charitable corporations by state legislatures may be viewed through
the legal prism of state versions of the Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine. Although essentially dormant in the federal courts, the
Private Non-Delegation Doctrine has enjoyed remarkable vigor on
the state court level. In addition, this Article will also propose that
the eight-part constitutional test constructed by the Texas Supreme
13
Court in Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Abbott, that
examines the state constitutionality of private delegations of public
power, be used as a model to assess similarly the state constitutionality
of the delegation of eminent domain power to private non-profit and
charitable corporations. Further, for those state legislatures that have
delegated or are contemplating delegation of eminent domain power
to private non-profit or charitable corporations, this Article will also
propose a number of statutory solutions that would permit
delegations of eminent domain power to private non-profit and
charitable corporations to survive state constitutional scrutiny under
state delegation and constitutional tests such as the test constructed
by the Texas court.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article will explain the Private NonDelegation Doctrine and its nexus to eminent domain. Part II will
then examine the rationales for the delegation of the takings power
to non-profit and charitable corporations and arguments weighing
against these delegations. Part II will also discuss the principles
supporting and disfavoring the wholesale abolishment of the
delegation of eminent domain power to private, non-profit and
charitable corporations, using the Massachusetts case study discussed
in Part IV of the Article to argue against a per se rule against these
delegations. Part III will introduce and discuss the Texas Boll Weevil
test, a model test that this Article argues may be applied by other state
courts to assess the constitutionality of private delegations of public
power under the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine, and in particular,
the private delegation of the takings power. Part IV will then present
purposes and thus entitled to special tax status under the Internal Revenue Code—
[a]lso termed eleemosynary corporation.” Id. Finally, the same source describes a
charitable organization as a “[a] tax-exempt organization that (1) is organized and
operated exclusively for religious, scientific, literary, educational, athletic, publicsafety, or community-service purposes, (2) does not distribute earnings for the
benefit of private individuals, and (3) does not participate in any political candidate
campaigns, or engage in substantial lobbying” (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). Id.
12. Id.
13. 952 S.W.2d 454 (1997).
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two case studies in which eminent domain power has been delegated
to private non-profit or charitable institutions and apply the Texas Boll
Weevil test to each. Part V will propose seven legislative solutions,
including Social Capital Impact Assessments (“SCIAs”), which may be
used to address any state constitutional failings under the Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine of private delegations of the public takings
power.
I.

THE PRIVATE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE (“PNDD”)
A. History

The general rule of non-delegation theoretically concerns the
conveyance of constitutionally assigned power to either another
branch of government that may not be constitutionally authorized to
14
wield it or to a non-governmental body. In the former instance, the
Public Non-Delegation Doctrine may be invoked when, for example,
the constitutionally assigned power of the judiciary is transferred to
the chief executive or to its agencies, when executive power allocated
by a constitution has been expropriated to the legislative branch of
government, or more commonly when legislative power is
15
transmitted to the executive.
Similarly, the Private Non-Delegation
14. See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1982) (noting that “[t]he delegation
doctrine also has a theoretical application to the transfer of any government power.”)
(emphasis added). In addition, the most common federal and state source of the
public and private non-delegation doctrine is separation of powers. Separation of
powers notes that each branch of government has power that has been primarily
allocated to it and that a branch of government may not abdicate the exercise of this
power to another branch or to another party. See, e.g., id. at 2-4 (“Madison’s practical
view of the separation-of-powers concept also provides an analogy and support for
the doctrine of American constitutional law that the powers of one branch of
government should not be wholly delegated to another.”); SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 24 (Univ. of Chi.
1975) (stating that “the rule of nondelegation is more frequently and regularly
associated with the separation of powers than it is with any other concept.”); Texas
Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. 1994)
(“More commonly, however, Texas has rooted its delegation jurisprudence only in
the principle of separation of powers.”). But see Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729,
733 (Tex. 1998) (contradicting the source of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine
noted in Texas Boll Weevil as stemming from Article III, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution that vests law-making power in the legislative branch instead of in
Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution that requires separation of powers
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, as the
concept of separation of powers as a source of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine
is irrelevant to a non-governmental actor that is not a part of any branch of
government).
15. See Aranson, supra note 14, at 4 (suggesting that the general non-delegation
doctrine could theoretically be applied to “[t]he transfer of judicial power to
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Doctrine has been most frequently used by courts, especially at the
state level, to assess the state constitutionality of a transfer or
delegation of legislative power to non-governmental actors or to
16
private parties.
executive agencies,” transfers of “executive power to the legislature,” but is most
commonly applied to conveyances of “legislative power to the executive.”). Indeed,
the issue of the delegation of legislative power to the executive was examined by John
Locke, who noted:
“the Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other
hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they, who have
it, cannot pass it over to others. . . . And when the people have said, We will
submit to rules, and be governed by Laws made by such Men, and in such
Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make Laws for them; nor can
the people be bound by any Laws but such as are Enacted by those, whom
they have Chosen, and Authorised to make Laws for them. The power of the
Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and
Institution, can be no other, than what the positive Grant conveyed, which
being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can
have no power to transfer their Authority of making laws, and place it in
other hands.”
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 380-81 (2d Treatise) (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1960).
16. For instance, the Supreme Court’s consideration of the delegation of
legislative power to private parties began and ended with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936), a decision in which the Court overturned the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 that called for the delegation of congressional power to
private producers of coal that elected twenty-three boards to set minimum coal prices
for each district and that also set pay rates and working hours for mining workers.
Coal producers who chose not to participate in the boards were subject to a fifteen
percent assessment on their sales of coal. However, in the state courts, the Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine has been used in recent years to examine the delegation of
legislative power to private parties. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Thirtieth Annual
Administrative Law Issue Governance of the Internet: Article Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 155-56
(2000) (“But while the Supreme Court has had no modern opportunities to revisit
the private nondelegation doctrine, the state courts have had that chance, and their
treatment of the issue underlines the importance of the doctrine today.”), Carl
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1128
(1977) (noting that the “nondelegation principle continues to have greater utility at
the state level. . . .”); Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 454 (overturning the Texas
legislature’s delegation of legislative authority to the “Official Cotton Growers’ Boll
Weevil Eradication Foundation,” a private non-profit entity, as an unconstitutionally
broad delegation of legislative power to operate programs designed to eradicate the
boll weevil, a pest that attacks cotton crops); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of
Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (holding that certain portions of the Texas Water
Code were unconstitutional because they delegated certain legislative powers related
to water quality to private landowners owning 1,000 acres or more); Proctor, 972
S.W.2d at 729 (upholding the delegation of power to consider appeals regarding
suspensions and demotions to private arbitrators, pursuant to the Texas Civil Service
Act, in lieu of appealing an action to the local civil service commission under Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine principles); see also Sedlack v. Dick, 887 P.2d 1119, 1134-35
(Kan. 1995) (upholding a statutory challenge that permitted business and union
officials to choose members of the Workers’ Compensation Boar because the statute
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to private parties); City of
Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130,132 (S.D. 1994) (invalidating under
the South Dakota version of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine that prohibits the
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B. Judicial Reluctance and the Private Delegation of Public Power
Courts find delegations of public power to private actors more
problematic than delegations to public authorities or agencies for
several reasons. First, there is less opportunity to hold private actors
that may be privately shielded and privately governed publicly
accountable for the choices they make with the public power
17
delegated to them.
Second, this potential for unaccountable
delegation of power may cause particular alarm for courts, given the
inherent conflicts that may arise between the interest of the public
and that of the private delegate, as well as the potential for abuse of
the power by the private delegate. For instance, the Texas Supreme
Court focused on the inherent divergence of interests between a
private delegate of public power and the public that may unwittingly
lead to an abusive of exercise of the power. It stated that private
delegations, therefore, necessitate “more searching scrutiny” by the
18
courts than when power is delegated solely to a public entity. In
addition, the court has noted that delegations to private parties are
more constitutionally “troubling” and “are subject to more stringent
19
requirements and less judicial deference than public delegations.”
Third, some scholars have stated that the underlying reason that
delegation of public powers to private actors is more nettlesome to
the judiciary is that there are some powers that are “essentially
20
governmental.”
These public powers include “rulemaking,
state legislature from delegating “municipal functions” to any “special commission,
private corporation or association” a state statute that required cities to include
automatically the arbitration clause of the standard form contract of the American
Institute of Architects in their municipal contracts).
17. See Froomkin, supra note 16, at 155 (“Several courts and commentators have
agreed that delegations to private groups are more troubling than those to public
agencies because the accountability mechanisms are weaker or non-existent.”).
18. See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 469 (“More fundamentally, the basic
concept of democratic rule under a republican form of government is compromised
when public powers are abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people,
appointed by a public official or entity, nor employed by the government. Thus, we
believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private delegations to a more
searching scrutiny than their public counterparts.”); see also id. (citing George W.
Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650,
659 (1975) (“Where a delegation by virtue of its content or breadth calls into
question the future operation of the political process [by impinging on fundamental
notions of representative democracy], judicial scrutiny seems warranted.”)).
Similarly, in Carter Coal, the Supreme Court noted that private delegation is
“legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an
official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose
interests may be and often are adverse to the interest of others in the same business.”
298 U.S. at 311.
19. FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 874.
20. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 648.
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adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, and licensing
21
and taxation.” The common denominator between them, however,
22
For instance, one who has these
is the “element of coercion.”
powers can force someone to do something that she does not wish to
do; or conversely, that same entity can force an individual not to do
23
something that she would like to do.
In contrast, power generally viewed as “private,” is centered
squarely within the ability of an individual to consent to an action,
24
and it is primarily found in contract law or in property ownership.
For example, a private property owner may bar or permit others from
entering her real property by caprice alone, and she may subject this
25
admission to certain rules of her making. Moreover, by virtue of her
being a real property owner, she may constrain the uses of real
26
property in the surrounding area under nuisance law. In addition,
the law of contracts gives private parties the right to define rules and
27
regulations amongst themselves.
Therefore, because of the coercive nature of public, or traditionally
governmental power, exemplified by a lack of consent to an action or
decision by an affected individual, governments choose generally to
outsource or to privatize “ministerial or mechanical functions” and
28
These services and functions
non-coercive responsibilities.
frequently include the building of roads, waste collection, or the
administration of health care where the risk of the interest of a
29
private party colliding with that of the public is minimized. When
coercive power that is traditionally wielded by government is
exercised by publicly unaccountable private parties that may have
divergent interests from those of the public, increasing the likelihood
of abuse by the private delegate, it is, therefore, quite understandable
30
that courts will scrutinize that power much more closely.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1398, 1399 (1954).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Suss v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F. Supp. 181,
189 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a business owner had standing to sue after officers
of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, a private non-profit
corporation delegated the authority by the New York legislature to enforce state laws
protecting animals, broke through a wall without a warrant into the owner’s building
to save a cat).
29. Freeman, supra note 2, at 552.
30. Id.
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The judicial branch’s concern about the delegation of public
power to private parties, however, is much more than academic.
Indeed, this concern has been borne out in the real world, as the way
in which private delegates of public power have conducted
31
themselves has proved historically “unsatisfactory.”
C. The Private Non-Delegation Doctrine’s Nexus to Eminent Domain
Eminent domain has traditionally been explored through
variations of the Takings clause that incorporate the Public Use and
Just Compensation clauses of the U.S. constitution or its variations in
many state constitutions. These passages speak directly to the
principle of eminent domain or the coerced seizure of private
property. For example, the Fifth Amendment of the federal
constitution states that “Nor shall private property be taken for public
32
use, without just compensation.” Similarly, many state constitutions
have equivalent provisions directly relating to eminent domain that
require that seized land be used for a public use or a public purpose
and that just, reasonable, or adequate compensation be rendered to a
33
landowner.
31. See id. (citing W. Browne, Altgeld of Illinois ch. VIII-XIC (1924), and
describing the conduct of private detectives who were deputized as police officers
during the railway strike of 1984); see also Washington v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 12122 (1928) (striking down an amendment to a zoning ordinance that required a
landowner who wanted to build a retirement center for low-income elderly residents
to obtain the written consent of two-thirds of the landowners within 400 feet of the
site because the consenting landowners “are not bound by any official duty but are
free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the trustee
[the landowner desiring to build the home] to their will or caprice,” thereby
violating the Due Process Clause); Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Reg’l Sch. Dist.
Comm., 352 A.2d 634 (R.I. 1976) (holding that a Rhode Island statute that required
public school districts to bus schoolchildren residing within the district’s boundaries
to private schools unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to private schools, as
they could establish how far a privately educated child could be bussed, regardless of
whether the school was in the boundaries, and therefore how much the public
school district would have to spend for these purposes); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1110-11 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(writing that the Unfair Competition Law in California that gave ordinary citizens,
not just public prosecutors, standing to sue delegated public authority to prosecute
to private citizens, thereby holding potential defendants arbitrarily hostage to selfinterested “unelected, unaccountable private enforcers, unrestrained by established
notions of concrete harm or public duty, [who] seek to advance their own agendas
or deploy the law as leverage to increase attorney fees”).
32. U.S. CONST. art. V.
33. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, sec. 17 (Vernon 1997) (stating that “[n]o person’s
property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without
adequate compensation being made.”) (emphasis added) and MA. CONST. art. I, sec. 10
(noting that “[a]nd whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any
individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable
compensation therefor.”) (emphasis added).
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This Article contends that state versions of the Private NonDelegation Doctrine may be an alternate legal and constitutional
vehicle by which to explore the issue of eminent domain power that
has been delegated to non-governmental actors, and in particular, to
34
non-profit or charitable corporations. In a post-Kelo world in which
the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the expansion of the federal
“public use” requirement to include private economic development
that has a public purpose but also that benefits private nongovernmental actors, the time may be especially ripe for a new
analytical framework for eminent domain. This framework would
assess the constitutionality of the very public eminent domain power
wielded by non-governmental actors under state versions of the
Private Non-Delegation Doctrine that is separate and apart from the
traditional Takings clause, including Public Use and Just
Compensation, analysis.
Therefore, although historically in state and constitutional
jurisprudence the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine has involved the
35
delegation of purely legislative authority to private parties, the
Doctrine refers specifically to the delegation of the takings power by
36
the legislature to private parties in the eminent domain context.
Historically, delegation of eminent domain power to common
carriers, such as private railroad companies and private companies
that operate public utilities, has been upheld by courts. For instance,
34. See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d
454, 493 (Tex. 1994) (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that in response to the Texas Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a delegation
of legislative power to a private non-profit, deeming it unconstitutional pursuant to a
eight-step inquiry, that the court failed to “consider the impact of its decision on the
[Texas] Legislature’s common practice of delegating eminent domain powers to
private entities”); see also FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d
868, 899 (Tex. 2000) (Abbott, J., dissenting) (making a similar case in answer to the
Texas Supreme Court’s holding that the Texas legislature had unconstitutionally
delegated power to private landowners to create water quality zones and questioning
how the court could “reconcile” its holding with “existing legislative grants of
eminent domain power to private entities”).
35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36. See Benjamin McCorkle, Constitutional Law—Arkansas’s Nondelegation Doctrine:
The Arkansas Supreme Court Defines a Limit on the Delegation of Legislation Authority to a
Private Party, Leathers v. Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc., 338 Ark. 425, 884 S.W.2d 481
(1999), 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 297, 299 (2000) (“The nondelegation
doctrine is the judicial interpretation of what authority a legislative body can
delegate to another branch of government, administrative agencies, or nongovernmental entities.”); see also 2006 Eminent Domain Made Easy, Office of the
Attorney General of Texas, p.3, www.oag.state.tx.us/AGPublications/pdfs/2006
eminentdomaineasy.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2007) (noting that “[t]he power of
eminent domain is delegated by statutory provision to state agencies, political
subdivisions, and to certain private entities.”)).
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the Supreme Court noted in Luxton v. North River Bridge Company that
it is “beyond dispute” that Congress could constitutionally delegate
the takings power to private, for-profit companies such as private
37
railroad corporations. While grounding its holding in the Necessary
and Proper and the Commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution, to
state that Congress could transfer to a corporation the power of
eminent domain to construct a rail bridge traversing a body of water
between two states, the Court’s analysis could have easily fit within
federal private non-delegation principles. Rail companies build
railroads and bridges as part of the profit-making motive of their
business, but also to help the public transport goods that drives the
economy. Hence, the profit-making interest of rail companies is
almost inextricably linked with that of the public. Consequently, the
risk of abuse of the power by rail companies against the public is
comparably low, since their interests are generally intertwined with
those of the public. As a result, some commentators have noted that,
given the impact that railroad and public utilities have on the
national economy, these private, for-profit companies should exercise
eminent domain, as they are more efficient and save state and federal
38
governments “time and money.”
Furthermore, just as the interests between common carriers and
the public are theoretically minimized, they are also generally held to
account by publicly accountable state agencies for the takings choices
that they make. For example, public utility companies are generally
highly regulated, and although private, for-profit companies, they
39
have an “inherent public nature.” In Texas, for instance, public
utilities generally have the power of eminent domain, but regulation
that holds them accountable to publicly accountable agencies and
officials and that minimizes conflicts of interest between the utility
and the public rules the roost. This regulatory scheme polices the
37. 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894); see Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2673 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that one of the three categories
in which the government may transfer private property to private entities is in the
case of common carriers, such as railroad companies and utility companies that will
make the property available for public use.)
38. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 657 (“Similarly, allowing private enterprises
such as railroads to directly exercise the power of eminent domain, saves the
government time and money.”).
39. See Chris Reeder, Regulation by Contractors: Delegation of Legislative Power to
Private Entities in Texas, 5 TEX. TECH. J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 191, 229 (2004) (noting as an
example of the public and highly regulated nature of the public utilities industry, in
contrast to other private industry, that they are bound to serving any customer who
qualifies for service in a non-discriminatory manner, including being nondiscriminatory in their rates).
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rates that are charged to customers, the acquisition of licenses and
franchises from state regulatory agencies and from cities, respectively,
and mandates that facilities be operated only after a state agency has
40
given its approval.
Also, with respect to an exercise of eminent
domain, Texas requires that a public utility may not run facilities on
41
seized land unless a state agency has approved the operation.
42
Finally, the state agency’s approval is based on a need for the utility.

II. ARGUMENTS FAVORING AND DISFAVORING THE DELEGATION OF THE
TAKINGS POWER TO PRIVATE, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
A. Why Delegate Eminent Domain Power to Private, Non-Profit
Corporations?
As with the Public Non-Delegation Doctrine, there are a number of
arguments in support of delegating the takings power to private, nonprofit corporations. An obvious argument is that delegating this
power to private, non-profit corporations is more efficient.
Government, and therefore, taxpayers, are spared the time and
expense of having to negotiate, seize, and purchase property under
eminent domain, especially from recalcitrant landowners who may be
43
opposed to the action. Instead, these costs are passed on to the
private, non-profit corporation, and taxpayers, therefore, save money.
For instance, in order to decrease the financial burden on taxpayers,
a number of judges and courts use private arbitration mechanisms in
44
lieu of appointing public judges to hear the same cases.
Moreover, government tends to be bureaucratic, and corporations
45
In the amount of time that it may take local
more supple.
government to seize property on behalf of a private, non-profit
corporation, that same non-profit, by virtue of its non-bureaucratic
nature, may have “moved on,” taking and investing with it muchneeded dollars in another community.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Indeed, some judges and courts have supported private delegation
because it favors more “privatization” and less government “regulation” or
interference. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 899 (Tex.
2000) (Abbot, J., dissenting).
44. FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 899.
45. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 655.
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Furthermore, political efficiency may also warrant the delegation of
eminent domain power to private, non-profit corporations. When
government decides to use its takings power, interest groups opposed
to the action may utilize the political process to delay or to halt the
taking. The reaction by the several homeowners in Kelo who were
opposed to the taking of their homes by the New London
Development Corporation is a perfect example of this situation. Not
only did the economic development plan envisioned by the city of
46
New London experience significant delay, but also the homeowners’
actions sparked a nationwide outcry against the use of the takings
47
power for economic development.
Similarly, in Poletown
46. William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A1. In June 2006, however, New London voted, in
opposition to the stance taken by Connecticut’s governor to evict the remaining
hold-outs in Fort Trumbull. See Avi Salzman, Connecticut City Takes First Step to Evict
Eminent Domain Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at B2. Furthermore, in July 2006, the
city’s Planning and Zoning Commission granted building permits for the economic
development project to begin. See Elaine Stoll, Commission Approves Hotel Suite Plan
For Fort Trumbull, THE DAY, July 22, 2006, at 2B.
47. See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct.
9, 2005, at B2; see also Timothy Egan, Rulings Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A12. Furthermore, at last count, approximately forty-one
states had introduced legislation to limit the use of eminent domain for private
economic development in response to Kelo. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right
to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1. For instance, in California
alone, five constitutional amendments and eight proposed pieces of legislation have
been put before the California Legislature to counter the Court’s decision in Kelo. In
Texas, the legislature acted swiftly and banned the use of eminent domain on behalf
of a private party, except for certain uses. Among these exceptions is the taking of
land for a new stadium for the Dallas Cowboys football team. In addition, in Ohio,
the legislature placed a one-year moratorium on all takings soon after the Kelo ruling.
See id.; see also Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA TODAY, Feb. 20,
2006, at 1A (noting the one-year moratorium in Ohio). See generally Terry Pristin,
Developers Can’t Imagine a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at
C5 (discussing different measures that states have taken in response to Kelo and
noting the opposition to the legislative groundswell from developers, some
lawmakers, and the real estate community). With respect to action taken on the
federal level, as of November 30, 2005, legislation was passed by Congress and signed
into law by the President that makes appropriations for certain government agencies
and provides that no funds shall be used for federal, state, or local projects that seek
to use the power of eminent domain for economic development that would primarily
benefit private parties. See Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 2494-95 (2005).
Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 4128, a bill that
proposes to prevent states and their political subdivisions from receiving federal
economic development funds for two years if a court of competent jurisdiction rules
that eminent domain has been used for economic development. Private Property
Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005). The same
legislation also allows not only for individuals to sue local or federal government to
enforce any provision of the proposed law, but also for the awarding of attorney’s
fees should a plaintiff prevail. Id. § 4(a), (c). It also prevents the federal government
from using eminent domain for economic development. Id. § 3. The proposed law
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48

Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the residents of the Poletown
neighborhood made national headlines by using the political process
to protest General Motors (“GM”) and the city of Detroit for seizing
their land for the construction of a Cadillac manufacturing plant.
The residents achieved a temporary victory in delaying the “quick49
take” project, but they were ultimately powerless to stop the takings.
Therefore, much as members of Congress may relish delegating
power to federal agencies because the agencies “take the heat” for
unpopular decisions with the electorate and these representatives
may “look good” before their constituents when opposing those
50
decisions, state legislators may often welcome the delegation of the
takings power to non-profits. Legislators are ultimately removed
from political and electoral accountability, yet, by virtue of the
delegation, may simultaneously and indirectly bestow benefits onto
powerful non-profit corporations in exchange for financial support
that keeps them in office.
Yet another powerful reason that legislatures may delegate the
power of eminent domain is that, as with all delegations, there is
nothing in many state constitutions and in the federal Constitution
that expressly forbids the general delegation of legislative power to
other entities, private or public, or to other branches of

broadly defines economic development as, “taking private property, without the
consent of the owner, and conveying or leasing such property from one private
person or entity to another private person or entity for commercial enterprise
carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general
economic health. . . .” Id. § 8(1). As of the writing of this Article, however, the U.S.
Senate has not acted on this measure. In general, however, although new legislation
to protect private property owners from economic development takings is still being
introduced the legislative momentum spurred by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kelo seems to have slowed tremendously almost a year after the decision.
48. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that
allowed the city of Detroit to take land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer
it to General Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto plant because the public
benefits promised by the plant were substantial).
49. The residents opposed to the project in the Poletown neighborhood formed
the Poletown Neighborhood Council. See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 1868. For an
excellent history of the Poletown case, see generally BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W.
BACHELOR, THE SUSTAINING HAND (1986).
50. See THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 92-3, 298-99 (1969) (“As Kenneth Davis puts it, Congress in effect
says, ‘Here is the problem: deal with it.’”); id. (“A delegation of power to the
president or to agencies is in reality a delegation of personal responsibility [by
Congress]. . . .”).
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51

government. In effect, there is generally no Private or Public Non52
Delegation Doctrine written into many state constitutions.
A final reason to support the notion that the private delegation of
power to non-profits is not problematic is that legislatures in
delegating this power should be given deference in the decisions they
make. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has supported deferring
to the decisions of state legislatures in the eminent domain context.
In Kelo, the Court recently underscored the “great respect” that it
held for state legislatures’ assessments and determinations of “local
53
needs.” Finally, with respect specifically to the delegation of public
power to private entities, some commentators have noted that such a
choice can be “reasonable and therefore deserves the judicial respect
54
given any reasonable legislative policy choice.”
B. Arguments In Support of Restricting Delegation of Eminent Domain Power
to Private, Non-Profit Corporations
The right to seize property is a traditional government power that,
like most similar government powers such as the power to arrest
55
someone, to tax, and to license, is coercive in nature. The sovereign
may force an individual to do or not to do something against his or
56
her will.
When this coercive power of seizure of property is
delegated to private non-profits, indeed to any private party, there is
undoubtedly created an opportunity for these parties to seize
property for themselves at the expense of the public, creating the
potential for abuses of power. This potential for abuse of power
stems from the conflicting interests of the private delegate and the
public which is at the heart of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine.
The private delegate may act in its own interests instead of in the
public’s interest and to the general detriment of the public or to an
51. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
52. See id. at 331 (expressing the belief that the Constitution includes a NonDelegation Doctrine, but that there is no “express nondelegation doctrine in the
text”) (emphasis added).
53. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005). In addition, at the
state level, some courts have noted that the legislative branch has the sole power to
“invest” certain entities at its choosing, public or private, with eminent domain
power. See, e.g., Annbar Assocs. v. W. Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635,
647 (Mo. 1965). Furthermore, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), the Court
stated that “. . . .when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served.”
54. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 651.
55. See supra notes 5, 20-293 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
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individual. This opportunity for “self-interested” action is a result
of a classic conflict-of-interest scenario.
The delegation of public power, such as eminent domain, to
private parties may be contrasted with similar delegations to
government agencies. However, unlike private parties, agencies are
often headed by appointees of the head of the executive branch and
59
confirmed by the legislature, or are directly elected in some states.
In addition, officers must generally take an oath of office promising
60
that they will uphold the laws of the land, not their self-interest.
Furthermore, there is often the weight of the public purse and the
prospect of a cut in funding to a particular agency by the legislature
that keeps an agency accountable, should the agency be mismanaged
61
and act in ways that benefit certain parties and not the public. In
contrast, delegating the power to seize property to private actors that
may be unaccountable to the electorate, given the conflicting
interests of the public and the private delegate, may not satisfy the
state constitutional demands of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine.
In essence, there is an expectation that a public official with
coercive governmental powers in hand will act in a “disinterested”
62
way and not allow self-interest to guide his or her decision-making.
When this expectation is not satisfied in the public’s opinion, then
63
the electorate “may vote the [public] rascals out.” The public is,
therefore, utilizing the ultimate mechanism of democracy, the voting
booth, to account for the government’s substantive choices and the
way that it chooses to exercise its power.
Depending on the enabling legislation granting the private
delegation of a public power, such as the abusive exercise of the
takings power that has been delegated to a private, non-profit, no
64
similar “accountability mechanisms” or statutory checks may exist to

57. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 659 (noting that “[t]he concern is that
governmental power—power coercive in nature—will be used to further the private
interests of the private actor, as opposed to some different public interest.”); see also
Froomkin, supra note 16, at 153-54 (discussing that “. . . .the Carter Coal doctrine
forbidding delegation of public power to private groups is, in fact, rooted in a
prohibition against self-interested regulation. . . .”).
58. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 660.
59. See Reeder, supra note 39, at 218, 226 (discussing the accountability measures
on public agencies in Texas).
60. Id. at 218.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 660.
64. Froomkin, supra note 16, at 29-30.
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deal with these “private rascals.”
It is this unchecked lack of
accountability that may fuel opportunities for private, non-profit
corporations to self-aggrandize in contravention of a state’s Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine.
It is also this potential for selfaggrandizement at the expense of the public in private delegations of
public power that spurred the Texas Supreme Court to describe the
private non-profit association in the Texas Boll Weevil case as “[l]ittle
more than a posse: volunteers and private entities neither elected
nor appointed, privately organized and supported by the majority of
some small group, backed by law but without guidelines or
supervision, wielding great power over people’s lives and property but
66
answering virtually to no one.”
Therefore, although the delegation of eminent domain power to
private, non-profit entities with little or no public accountability
controls may be more time and cost-efficient, as well as more
politically efficient and expedient, practically they may spur an
abusive exercise of the public power.
Constitutionally, the
delegations may run afoul of a state’s Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine. Moreover, the mere threat of a private, non-profit
corporation’s having eminent domain power, regardless of whether
or not it actually uses it to seize private property, is reason enough to
support statutory accountability controls that mitigate the conflicts of
interest and potential for abuse by the private delegate. It is likely
that this mere threat is intimidating, especially to unsophisticated
homeowners and small business owners who are unfamiliar with
eminent domain and who may be scared into selling their real
property at below-market prices at the first mention of “eminent
domain” by a powerful private non-profit institution.
Finally, one of the strongest arguments in support of statutory
accountability controls on the delegation of the takings power to
private, non-profit corporations that mitigate conflicts of interest and
the potential for abuse of power is that when government or a quasigovernmental organization chooses to exercise this power, it is often,
at the very least, after intense public discussion and public hearings
that provide for a significant amount of public input. The effect of
these public conversations is often to compel government to consider
alternative points of view that may conceivably force a re-thinking or

65. Id.
66. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 479
(Tex. 1994) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the abandonment of its use. Should these public discussions result
in outcomes that the public deems unfavorable, it has the
opportunity to hold elected officials who make up government in
68
part accountable for their decisions on Election Day. Consequently,
when government and even public agencies are expected (1) to hold
public hearings, (2) are subject to being voted out of office, and (3)
are expected to abide by the minimum federal constitutional
requirements of “just compensation” and “public use,” and any
additional state constitutional requirements, it is no more than
logical that private entities empowered with government-like powers
to coerce the seizure of private property should be subject, at a
minimum, to equivalent or to stricter requirements.
C. A Per Se Rule Against the Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to
Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations?
Given the reasons outlined in Part II.B of this Article in support of
restrictions on private actor delegates in the takings context, the
question arises as to whether or not there should be a per se rule
prohibiting delegations of the takings power to private, non-profit
and charitable corporations. Indeed, this line of reasoning is
strengthened, as these private actors may have significant political
and economic power that may bind them inextricably to elected
officials and allow them to influence officials to a large degree.
Despite the persuasive arguments in favor of a per se abolishment
of private delegations of the takings power, this Article takes a more
pragmatic approach to them. As noted in Part IV.A of this Article
with respect to the Texas Medical Center case study, the economic
impact of some private, non-profit corporations delegated the takings
power on local communities is immense. This economic impact,
67. See, e.g., Rad Sallee, Metro Schedules Three Public Hearings on New Rail Line,
HOUS. CHRON., July 14, 2006, at B7 (reporting that Houston, Texas’ public transport
authority, or METRO, that has eminent domain power, has scheduled a series of
public hearings regarding its proposed expansion of commuter rail in
neighborhoods and that contemplates the use of eminent domain).
68. See, e.g., Wendy Hudley, Allison Says Voters Wanted Change: He Credits Opposition
to Underpass as Key to Council Victory, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 16, 2005, at 1S
(discussing the ousting of an incumbent from the Richardson, Texas, City Council,
the first in sixteen years, who had supported the use of eminent domain); Clay
Barbour, Eminent Domain’s Electoral Fallout, Elected Officials Face Widespread Opposition
and Voter Wrath, ST. LOUIS POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1; Lisa Smith, St. Charles Voters
Hand Mayor’s Job to De Witte, Klinkhamer’s Eight-year Tenure Ends Following Bitter
Campaign, DAILY HERALD, Apr. 6, 2005, at 1 (noting that now ex-mayor Klinkhamer
had approved condemnation of property for a redevelopment project the year
before, without involving the public).
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whether on an entire city, as in the Texas Medical Center case study
in Houston, or on an entire neighborhood, as in the Dudley
Neighbors, Inc. case study in Boston, is a double-edged sword to local
69
communities. Essentially, in exchange for this economic impact and
the significant “run-off” effects onto the local community, there is an
argument that it may be reasonable to afford these entities the
takings power, albeit not without accountability controls that would
minimize the potential for abuses of an exercise of eminent domain
as a result of the conflicting interests between the private delegate
and the public.
Moreover, the Dudley Neighbors, Inc. case study in Boston
evidences that statutory mechanisms that ultimately minimize the
abuses of power that may result from the conflicts in interest of a
private, non-profit delegate of eminent domain power may satisfy the
70
constitutional demands of a state’s private non-delegation norm. In
addition, there is the further argument that, to a certain extent, local
communities should be able to decide how much of the takings
power and by what strictures they are willing to delegate to a private
non-profit corporation.
Allowing room for the delegation of the takings power to these
private actors, however, does not otherwise diminish the argument
that there need be suitable statutory controls in place that would
satisfy the demands of a state’s private non-delegation doctrine,
71
ensuring that the rights of all affected individuals are respected.
III. THE TEXAS BOLL WEEVIL TEST
A. Description
In its 1997 Texas Boll Weevil decision, the Texas Supreme Court
struck down the creation and delegation of power to the private, nonprofit Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation by the Texas
legislature as unconstitutional under the Texas Private Non72
Delegation Doctrine. The legislature had created the Foundation in
order to eradicate the boll weevil insect, a pest that attacks cotton
crops and results in significant economic damage to cotton
73
producers. In the decision, the court outlined a preliminary three69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See infra Parts IV.A & B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V regarding recommendations for statutory safeguards.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
Id.
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part inquiry to use in determining the constitutionality of a private
74
delegation. This initial three-part test involves: (1) determining
whether or not the powers delegated to an entity are legislative or
75
76
law-making, pursuant to separation of powers analysis, that dictates
that any power deemed legislative must stay in the legislative branch;
77
(2) assessing whether or not the delegate is private or public; and
(3) if the delegation inquiry survives the previous two parts, analyzing
the constitutionality of a delegation under an additional eight-part
test. This eight-part test has been distilled from the scholarly work of
several well-known academics in the non-delegation field, such as
78
Professors Jaffe, Liebmann, Davis, and Lawrence. The Texas Boll
Weevil court, however, made it clear that the eight-part test was strictly
79
for private delegations, noting that it was required to give “more
80
searching scrutiny” to these delegations.
The constitutional analysis in Texas Boll Weevil initially focuses on
whether or not there has been an impermissible delegation of
legislative power, power that is supposed to lie in the legislative
81
branch under the Texas Constitution. Despite the initial three-part
74. See Reeder, supra note 39, at 213 (describing the initial three-part Texas Boll
Weevil test).
75. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 475
(Tex. 1994).
76. Id.
77. See Reeder, supra note 39, at 213; see also Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470
(“We first address whether the Foundation is a public or private entity for purposes
of the nondelegation doctrine.”).
78. Professor Jaffe is the author of the seminal law review article, Law Making by
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937); see Jaffe, supra note 5. Professor
Liebmann wrote Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J.
650 (1975); see Froomkin, supra note 16, at 155. Professor Davis authored the first
edition and a 1970 Supplement to an administrative law treatise that has been heavily
referred to in delegation circles entitled, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d
ed. 1978). Professor Lawrence’s work is cited throughout this Article. See Lawrence,
supra note 4.
79. Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
80. Id. at 469; see also supra notes 19-20.
81. This part of the Texas Boll Weevil inquiry concerns the state constitutional
source of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine.
See supra note 154 and
accompanying text. For instance, Article II, § 1 of the Texas Constitution, the
constitutional provision that mandates separation of powers, states that “[t]he powers
of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct
departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit:
Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those
which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one
of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the
others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.” TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
On the other hand, Article III, § 1 of the Texas Constitution notes explicitly that
“[t]he Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of
Representatives, which together shall be styled ‘The Legislature of the State of
Texas.’” TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also infra notes 97-100.
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inquiry, the heart of the Texas Boll Weevil analysis is the following
eight-part test:
(1) Are the private delegate’s actions subject to meaningful review
by a state agency or other branch of state government?;
(2) Are the persons affected by the private delegate’s actions
adequately represented in the decision making process?;
(3) Is the private delegate’s power limited to making rules, or does
the delegate also apply the law to particular individuals?;
(4) Does the private delegate have a pecuniary or other personal
interest that may conflict with his or her public function?;
(5) Is the private delegate empowered to define criminal acts or
impose criminal sanctions?;
(6) Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent, and subject
matter?;
(7) Does the private delegate possess special qualifications or
training for the task delegated to it?; and
(8) Has the Legislature provided sufficient standards to guide the
82
private delegate in its work?

In elucidating this eight-part test, the Texas court further provided
several indications as to how the eight factors should be weighed. For
instance, the Texas Boll Weevil court noted that, in order for a private
delegation to be an overly broad delegation of legislative power
under the provision of the Texas constitution that vests lawmaking
power solely in the legislature, a “majority of the factors” must be
83
violated. In addition, the court noted that the legislation at issue,
the Texas Boll Weevil Act, was to be constitutionally reviewed “as a
84
whole.” Nonetheless, the court signaled a cautionary note in its
application of the Texas Boll Weevil test, stating that it was to be
85
86
applied “sparingly” when private delegation was “‘running riot.’”
Moreover, the court definitively stated that a private delegation did
not have to comply with all eight factors in order to pass
constitutional muster under the Texas constitution—it just needed to
87
satisfy a majority of them.

82. Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
83. Id. at 475.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Justice Cardozo in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495, 553
(1935)).
87. Id.
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B. Subsequent Glosses on the Texas Boll Weevil Test
88

1. Proctor v. Andrews

In 1998, one year after the Texas Supreme Court identified the
eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, the court further clarified it in Proctor
v. Andrews. Proctor called into question the constitutionality of Texas’
89
Civil Service Act, a statute that provided firefighters and police
officers means to appeal decisions made by their superiors in which
they were suspended, passed over for promotion, or demoted. The
officer or firefighter could appeal either to the local civil service
90
commission or to an independent third party. If the officer were to
choose the latter route, the city was required to request seven
qualified neutral arbitrators from either the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
91
Service (“FMCS”). Under the statute, a municipality was required to
strike the names of those arbitrators that it would not choose to
92
conduct the hearings. Unless the decision of this arbitrator was
unlawful, the decisions were final, and the officer or firefighter
effectively waived his right to appeal the decision to the district
93
court. In Proctor, three cases were consolidated in which the city of
Lubbock had failed to request seven arbitrators or to strike
94
Proctor filed suit seeking a
arbitrators pursuant to the statute.
declaratory injunction compelling Lubbock’s compliance, and the
city counter-sued contending that the Civil Service Act was
95
unconstitutional.
The Proctor court held that the Texas legislature had not acted
unconstitutionally in delegating the power to arbitrate grievances of
civil service personnel to private parties under Texas’s Civil Service
96
Act. The court first stated that the case involved a delegation of
97
power to a private actor, and it essentially declined to conduct the

88. 972 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1998).
89. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.001.
90. Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 732.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 733 ( “Because the delegates in the instant case are not affiliated
with any department of the state government. . . . ”).
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private versus public actor analysis in the second part of the initial
98
three-part inquiry that it embraced in Texas Boll Weevil.
Secondly, the court explained that when an unquestionably private
actor is the recipient of a delegation, then the constitutional source
of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine derives from Article III,
Section 1 of the Texas Constitution that vests legislative power solely
99
in the legislative branch. In contrast, the Texas Boll Weevil court held
that the test sounded in the separation of powers provisions found in
100
Another gloss on the
Art. II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Boll Weevil test that the Proctor court provided was to state that,
even with the eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, it would interpret
101
delegations in the most constitutional light possible.
102

2. FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin

Subsequently, in 2000, the Texas Supreme Court decided FM
Properties, a case in which the city of Austin sought a declaratory
injunction against private landowners who owned more than 500
acres of land, from designating “water quality and protection zones”
103
within Austin’s extraterritorial jurisdictions.
The city contended
104
that allowed
that section 26.179 of the Texas Water Code,
landowners to designate certain water zones as “protected,” was an
unconstitutional delegation of power under Texas’ Private NonDelegation Doctrine. The city also provided the following five
reasons to support its arguments that the pertinent section of the
Water Code was unconstitutional:
(1) the provision
unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers to private landowners;
(2) it targeted the city of Austin; (3) the statute infringed on the city’s
home rule powers conferred by the Texas Constitution; (4) it violated
the city’s property rights; and (5) the statute allowed private property

98. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472
(Tex. 1994).
99. Nonetheless, the court also stated that the Texas Boll Weevil test could be
applied to delegations of legislative authority derived from the separations of powers
language in Article III, Section 1 of the Texas constitution. See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at
735.
100. Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
101. See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 735 (“Thus, we consider all eight factors, keeping in
mind that if it is possible to interpret the language of the statute in a manner that
renders it constitutional, we must do so.” (citing Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Co.
Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662) (Tex. 1996))).
102. 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000).
103. Id. at 872.
104. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.179.
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105

owners to suspend the laws.
The court struck down the statutory
delegation by the Texas legislature of power to private landowners to
create water quality zones as unconstitutional under the Private Non106
Delegation Doctrine.
In addition, the Texas Supreme Court in FM Properties provided
further clarification on the weight of each the eight factors in the
Texas Boll Weevil test. For instance, the court stated that the weight of
the factors was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, according to
107
Still, it generally noted that when it
each individual set of facts.
came to private delegations of legislative power, two factors in the
Texas Boll Weevil test would be most “heavily” weighted in analyzing
whether or not a particular private delegation was violative of the
Private Non-Delegation Doctrine because they address the “central
108
concerns” of the Doctrine.
These “central concerns” are:
(1) whether or not “the private delegate’s actions are subject to
meaningful review by a state agency or other branch of state
government;” and (2) whether or not the “private actor has a
pecuniary or other personal interest that may conflict with his or her
109
public function.”
Essentially, these central concerns refer to
whether or not sufficient accountability mechanisms exist in the
enabling legislation of the delegation to mitigate the conflicting
interests of a private delegate and the public and the potential for
abusive exercise of the delegated power by the private party.
For instance, one of the “heavily” weighted factors identified by the
court in FM Properties focuses on whether or not there is “meaningful
government review,” either by a state agency or other part of
110
government or a private delegate’s actions.
The requirement of
“meaningful government review” goes to one of the most potent and
central ways in a democracy in which private delegates of power may
be held accountable for ostensibly “public” actions—directly or

105. FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex.
2000).
106. Id. at 868.
107. See id. at 875 (“Boll Weevil does not specify if any factors weigh more heavily
than others, but the importance of each factor will necessarily differ in each case,”
and noting that the inquiry in Texas Boll Weevil places heavy emphasis on the first
factor of the eight-part inquiry, or whether there is meaningful government review of
a private delegate’s action).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472
(Tex. 1994).
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indirectly holding elected officials responsible for choices made by
private delegates.
In addition, the other “heavily” weighted factor in the Texas Boll
Weevil test subsequently emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court in
FM Properties examines the financial or personal interest that a private
actor might have in exercising delegated authority to it. This factor,
therefore, allowed the court to concentrate on the inherently selfinterested opportunities that arise for private delegates of public
power.
Finally, in FM Properties, the Texas court further refined the
definition of legislative power, at issue in the initial three-part Texas
111
Boll Weevil inquiry. The court stated in FM Properties that legislative
power is generally the power “to make rules and determine public
policy,” while including “many administrative aspects, including the
power to provide the details of the law, to promulgate rules and
regulations to apply the law, and to ascertain conditions upon which
112
existing laws may operate.”
C. The Texas Boll Weevil Test Under Scrutiny
The eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test has been criticized by some
113
commentators as too vague and subjective.
Indeed, although the
Texas Supreme Court stated that a private delegation must pass
muster under a majority of the eight factors to be nonviolative of the
state constitution, it is unclear exactly how many factors constitute a
majority. It is also unclear how much each factor should be weighted.
For example, the delegation analysis by the court in Texas Boll Weevil
resulted in the delegation’s “failing” five of the factors, “passing” one
114
factor, and being “inconclusive” or neutral in two others.
In
contrast, in Proctor, the delegation “passed” all factors, except for
115
one. Highlighting the subjective nature of the eight-part case-bycase inquiry, the Texas Supreme Court in Proctor disagreed with the
111. Id. at 465.
112. FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 873.
113. See Reeder, supra note 39, at 222-23 (asserting that the test gives little
“guidance” to lower courts, legislators, and private parties because of its “vagueness”
and that it “simply describes a subjective analysis”).
114. See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 473-75 (explaining and providing analysis
that the first, third, fourth, seventh, and eighth factors “weighed against” the
delegation, the second factor weighed in favor of it, and the fifth and sixth factors
were neutral).
115. See Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735-38 (Tex. 1998) (providing a
numerical tally of the analysis of the factors, in which the delegation passed all
factors except for the first factor in the Texas Boll Weevil inquiry, and providing
reasons for the analytical result).
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state court of appeals’ weighing of whether or not “the Legislature
had provided sufficient standards to guide the private delegate in its
116
work, as against the delegation.”
Similarly, in FM Properties, in which the Texas Supreme Court stated
that it would weigh more “heavily” (1) the availability of meaningful
review by the government and (2) the private delegate’s interests in
contrast to other factors of the Texas Boll Weevil test, the court in a
numerical breakdown determined that four factors of the eight-part
117
Texas Boll Weevil test weighed against the delegation. Two of these
four factors weighed “heavily” against the constitutionality of the
118
delegation.
On the other hand, the court stated the private
delegation passed muster under two of the factors and was neutral
with respect to two other parts of the test. Thus, the numerical tally,
that permitted the court to strike down the private delegation in FM
Properties under the Texas version of the Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine, was four against (two heavily), two in favor, and two
119
neutral.
Indeed, with the wide mix of numerical scenarios that has resulted
in the application of the Texas Boll Weevil test in only three cases
involving private delegations of public power, there are conceivably a
limitless number of numerical possibilities and weighted outcomes,
yielding a wide band of subjectivity and making the test “susceptible
120
to nuance.”
Questions, therefore, abound. As one commentator
has noted:
What would be the “right” mix of factors and heavily weighted
factors that would warrant upholding a private delegation? What if
the enactment narrowly fails five factors, but passes the other three
by a wide margin? Could a particular act fail a particular factor in
such an appalling and offensive way that it requires invalidating the
delegation, even if it passes all other factors? Should the courts
simply count all factors as equal, or perform a weighted average
121
balancing test? How should courts account for neutral factors?

116. See id. at 737-38 (highlighting the eighth factor of the Texas Boll Weevil test).
117. See FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 880-88 (providing an analysis of the factors and
determining that the first, second, fourth, and sixth factors of the Texas Boll Weevil
inquiry weighed against the delegation, of which the first and fourth weighed
“heavily” against it, but noting that the delegation passed muster under the third and
fifth factors of the inquiry, whereas there was a neutral outcome for the seventh and
eighth factors).
118. Id.
119. Reeder, supra note 39, at 213.
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id.
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Nonetheless, while it is true that the application of the Texas Boll
Weevil test has not yet resulted in clear numerical formulas and
weights for each of the eight factors, the Texas Supreme Court has, at
each application of the test, increasingly approached this point.
For example, after applying the test only three times, the court
surmised in FM Properties that of all eight factors, those touching upon
meaningful government review and the financial or personal interest
of the private delegate, the driving concerns of the Private NonDelegation Doctrine, are most important. Furthermore, the same
questions raised with respect to the lack of a clear mathematical
formula for determining whether a private delegation is
unconstitutional are common to many case-by-case, multi-step judicial
tests. The nature of the law is such that it is difficult to provide
precise mathematical formulas, given the varying nature of facts and
the myriad ways in which enabling statutes authorizing private
delegations may be made.
Moreover, the Texas Boll Weevil test, while not perfect, is one of the
few comprehensive tests that examine the constitutionality of private
delegations of public power. The test is, therefore, a good starting
point by which to analyze this issue, given that it addresses the
essence of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine—a desire to mitigate
the potential for abuses of public power when it is delegated to an
unaccountable private delegate.
D. Proposed Modifications of the Texas Boll Weevil Test that Address
122
Private Delegations of Eminent Domain Power
1. The eight-part core test
The Texas Boll Weevil test is a good analytical starting point because
it is one of the few comprehensive tests to examine the
constitutionality of private delegations, and it addresses and distills
many of the long-time concerns of many commentators. There is,
nonetheless, room for improvement of the test in the eminent
domain context.
For example, the following four factors of the Texas Boll Weevil test
go far in addressing the core concern of the Private Non-Delegation
122. As construed in this Article, the term “private delegations” concerns only the
delegation of eminent domain power to private non-profit and charitable
corporations, and it does not include the delegation of this power to “common
carriers” such as railroads and public utilities.
See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
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Doctrine, the prevention of an abusive exercise of public power by a
private delegate with interests that conflict with those of the public:
(1) meaningful government oversight of the delegation, (2) whether
or not individuals affected by a private delegate’s action have an
opportunity to be heard, (3) the self-interest of the exercised action
by the private delegate and how this interest affects the delegate’s
public function, and (4) whether or not there are any existing
123
limitations on the private delegate’s power.
These four factors
would appear to be most important in assessing the constitutionality
of the private delegation of eminent domain power, especially when
examined in light of the case studies of the Texas Medical Center and
the Dudley Neighborhood Initiative, Inc.
However, it may be argued that the qualification on one “heavily”
weighted factor of the Texas Boll Weevil test, concerning a private
actor’s pecuniary or personal interest, should be amended. As is
124
evidenced by the two case studies, instead of qualifying the private
delegate’s interest in terms of one “that may conflict with his or her
125
[the private actor’s] public function,” the qualification should be
couched in terms that relate to a landowner’s, a resident’s, or a
community’s interest.
On the other hand, while these four factors may address the two
particular delegates and the enabling statutes in the case studies in
this Article, future statutes may conceivably arise that permit a private
actor the right to define criminal sanctions if a landowner were to
resist the taking of his or her property, another of the Texas Boll
126
Weevil factors.
Therefore, although (1) meaningful government
oversight of the delegation, (2) an opportunity to be heard by
affected individuals, (3) an examination of the interests of the private
delegate, and (4) an analysis of any existing limitations on the private
delegate’s power address the current central concerns of the Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine in the eminent domain context, they may
not in future delegations of the takings power. Thus, for this reason
alone, the Texas Boll Weevil test is useful because of its comprehensive
nature in addressing a wide range of issues that may arise through
private delegations of any sort of traditional governmental and
coercive power, particularly eminent domain power.
123. These factors are respectively the first, second, fourth, and sixth factors of the
Texas Boll Weevil test. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952
S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex. 1994).
124. See infra Parts IV.A & B.
125. Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
126. This factor is the fifth item in the Texas Boll Weevil test. Id.
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2. The initial three-part inquiry
In addition, apart from the eight-factor core of the test, the initial
three-part inquiry of the Texas Boll Weevil test seems to be unduly
laden with particularly unwieldy issues when using it to assess the
constitutionality of the delegation of eminent domain power to
private non-profit and charitable corporations. For instance, the first
part of the initial three-part inquiry centers on whether or not there
has been legislative or law-making power delegated to a private
127
actor.
This analysis has required, in some instances, substantial
feats by the Texas Supreme Court to conform a particular delegation
to nebulous definitions of legislative or law-making power that
mandate that public policy be impacted or that a private delegate
128
engage in rulemaking.
A less unwieldy inquiry, especially in the eminent domain arena,
may, however, be one that centers on determining whether or not a
power is traditionally public, governmental, and therefore coercive.
A coercive power is one that has traditionally been exercised by
129
government.
Delegation of eminent domain power to a private
actor would, therefore, clearly fit within the confines of this
definition.
Moreover, the second part of the initial three-step test in recent
Texas practice has often been a needlessly drawn-out examination
130
For
determining whether or not an actor is public or private.
instance, in FM Properties and in Proctor, the Texas Supreme Court was
clear from the outset that delegation to a private actor was at issue.
In Proctor, power had been delegated to private arbitrators that were
131
unaffiliated with state government. In FM Properties, the delegation
132
had been made to private landowners.
In Texas Boll Weevil, however, the court appeared to undergo a
tortured process-of-elimination analysis in determining whether or
not the Official Cotton Growers’ Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation

127. Id. at 465.
128. See FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 873-74 (Tex.
2000) (noting that legislative or law-making power is one that impacts public policy
or engages in rulemaking, while failing to specify how the particular delegation at
issue in the case fit into the definition) (citing Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 46667).
129. See supra notes 5 & 20-23.
130. Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 465.
131. Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 733.
132. See FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 875 (“The City asserts that Section 26.179
delegates legislative power to private landowners. We agree.”).
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133

was a private or a public entity.
On the one hand, the Texas
Commissioner of Agriculture had to certify the Foundation, making
the Foundation appear to be a public actor. On the other hand, the
court cited the following factors to determine that the Foundation
was a private actor: (1) the Foundation was ultimately a private, nonprofit organization that had resulted from the petitioning of the
Commissioner of Agriculture by Texas Cotton Producers, Inc.,
134
another non-profit that represented growers of cotton, (2) the
Foundation’s board members did not have to take public oaths of
office, (3) the funds collected by the Foundation were statutorily
outside the scope of state funds, and (4) the funds were not subject to
135
governmental procurement and audit requirements.
While
theoretically there may be instances in which it may be unclear if a
particular entity delegated this power is a private or a public agency,
this part of the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil inquiry in the
eminent domain context may be unnecessary, given the limited
amount of potentially private actors that fall outside the traditional
delegates of eminent domain power-railroads, public utilities, and
136
private actors of similar ilk.
IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO TWO CASE STUDIES IN WHICH EMINENT
DOMAIN POWER HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO PRIVATE, NON-PROFIT OR
CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
The two case studies discussed in this section of this Article are
actual examples in which the very public power of eminent domain
has been delegated to a private non-profit or charitable corporation.
The first case study, the Texas Medical Center, illustrates the
inherent abuses about which the Private Non-Delegation is
concerned when the takings power is delegated unconstitutionally to
an unaccountable non-profit corporation. In contrast, the second
case study, Dudley Neighbors, Inc, represents the opposite end of
the private non-delegation spectrum and the benefits of these
delegations when appropriate statutory accountability mechanisms
are put into place that mitigate any abusive exercises of power as a

133. See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470-71 (undertaking the private v. public
actor analysis).
134. See id. at 459 (noting that Texas Cotton Producers, Inc. spurred the creation
of the Foundation).
135. Id. at 470-71.
136. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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result of any diverging interests between the private delegate and the
public.
A. Case Study One: The Texas Medical Center (“TMC”)
1. History
The Texas Medical Center (“TMC”) is a non-profit charitable
137
corporation that oversees the largest medical complex in the
138
world, spans more than 1,000 acres of land in the heart of Houston,
139
Texas to which over thirteen hospitals, two medical schools, and
four nursing schools, with additional schools of dentistry, public
140
Although TMC does not itself
health, and pharmacy belong.
provide patient care or employ any medical personnel, it owns and
manages much of the real property and provides maintenance and
ancillary services, including upkeep of roads, landscaping, and
constructing of parking facilities, for its forty-two member
141
institutions.
As an example of the influence that TMC has, the
member institutions of TMC brought approximately $3.5 billion in
medical research funding to Houston between the years 2000 and
2004, employed over 63,000 workers in 2004, and had 5.2 million
142
patient visits in 2004 alone.
143
TMC was granted the power of eminent domain in 1959. It has
used its takings power on at least one occasion in 2004 to condemn a
137. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 1 (2005).
138. Visit Houston Texas Fast Facts, http://www.visithoustontexas.com/visitors/
fast_facts/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
139. Texas Medical Center Master Plan 2006, http://www.tmc.edu/masterplan/
2006/HiRes2006updatev.2.pdf, p.2 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
140. Texas Medical Center Introduction, http://www.tmc.edu/tmc-introduction.
html ( last visited on Jan. 24, 2007).
141. Texas Medical Center Facts and Figures, http://www.tmc.edu/tmc-facts.html
(last visited Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter TMC Facts]; see also GuideStar.org, http://
www.guidestar.org/pq ShowGsReport.do?np.oID+14224 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
142. TMC Facts, supra note 141.
143. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 (2005). Although the statute does not
mention TMC by name, the description of the non-profit charitable corporation
contained in the statute matches that of TMC. For instance, section one of the
statute notes that “[a]ny nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of this
state for purely charitable purposes and which is directly affiliated or associated with
a medical center having a medical school recognized by the Council on Medical
Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association as an integral part of
its establishment, and which has for a purpose of its incorporation the provision or
support of medical facilities or services for the use and benefit of the public, and
which is situated in any county of this state having a population in excess of six
hundred thousand (600,000) inhabitants according to the most recent Federal
Census shall have the power of eminent domain and condemnation. . . .” Id.
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residential house in an adjacent neighborhood as part of a plan to
construct a five-story, approximately 500-space parking garage on
land previously occupied by houses in a residential neighborhood in
144
Houston. The parking garage was opposed by the residents in the
neighborhood not only because of the attendant safety and aesthetic
concerns with having a large parking structure in a residential area
with many families with young children, but also because it violated
the community’s deed restrictions, or private land covenants, that
restricted the use of property in the neighborhood to largely single145
family housing.
2. Accountability mechanisms in TMC’s enabling legislation
TMC has very little statutory restrictions in place that require it to
be accountable to the public when it exercises its statutorily delegated
takings power. This lack of accountability controls sets the stage for
abusive exercises of power when TMC uses its takings power for its
own interests, without taking into account those of the public or a
community. For example, sections two and four of the Texas
enabling statute allow TMC to use Pac-Manesque powers to use its
“full authority” of eminent domain power to acquire “adjacent or
146
contiguous” property to it.
As TMC grows, it may seize more and
144. See Texas Med. Ctr. v. Joe Alfred Izen, Jr. & City of Houston, Texas, No.
814.303 (Harris County Ct. Aug. 13, 2004) (noting that the county commissioners’
award to TMC assessed the value of the seized real property at $80,000 in the
condemnation proceeding). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author notes that
the taking of this real property occurred in her neighborhood and the plan and
eventual construction of the parking garage in violation of private deed restrictions
was vigorously protested by the Central City Preservation Coalition, the arm of the
neighborhood homeowner’s association designed to protest the construction and
taking. The author was Vice-Chair of this organization. For Texas legislative
hearings regarding the neighborhood’s protests, see Texas House Bill 2537 in the
Land and Resource Management Committee (during the 79th Regular Session),
http://www.house.state.tx.us/fx/av/committee79/50421p25.ram.
Representative
Garnet Coleman’s, the Texas House of Representatives member who aided the
Central City Preservation Coalition, exchange with Rep. Beverley Wooley on Texas
Senate Bill 62, regarding limitations on eminent domain, on the floor of the Texas
House is at 1:10:10 can be found at http://www.house.state.tx.us/fx/av/chamber
79/081005a.ram. In addition, as a result of these protests in the Author’s
neighborhood, a city-wide civic group, Citizens Against Eminent Domain Abuse, was
formed, of which the Author is Chair.
145. See Texas Medical Center v. Joe Alfred Izen, Jr. & City of Houston, Texas, No.
814.303 (Harris County Ct. Aug. 13, 2004).
146. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 §§ 2,4 (2005) (granting TMC “full
authority and [eminent domain] power” “for the purpose of acquiring lands
adjacent to or contiguous (whether or not separated by public thoroughfares)” to it
for the construction, maintenance, and operation of “facilities dedicated to medical
care, teaching, and research for the public welfare, including ancillary or service
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147

more land near it.
In addition, sections three and four of the
statute permit TMC to use its taking power to transfer title or to lease
property acquired through eminent domain to any “nonprofit
corporation, association, foundation, or trust” for 99 years with a
148
renewal option.
On the other hand, there are at least three restrictions on TMC’s
use of the takings power in the enabling legislation. First, section five
of the law notes that should TMC acquire property through eminent
domain and choose not to use the acquired land “for the purpose of
medical care, teaching, or research or essential ancillary and service
activities,” then title to the seized property will revert to the original
149
owner or to his or her “heirs, devisees, or assigns.” Second, section
six of the enabling statute, a recent amendment to it, requires that
before TMC begins the takings process or records title to acquired
real property, it must provide “written notice by certified mail” to
each recorded landowner of property for each parcel of land that it
“seeks to acquire or purchase; or that is not more than 200 feet from
150
any boundary of any unit of real property.”
The intended use of
the property, whether it is seized through eminent domain or
purchased outright, must not comport with deed restrictions or
151
private land covenants.
Third, the statute mandates that should
TMC exercise its takings power, then a condemnation hearing must
be held in which three special county commissioners’ award damages
152
and costs to an aggrieved landowner for his or her property.
However, once TMC pays the damages and costs to a landowner,
deposits this money with the court, and executes a bond, then it may
153
take possession of the seized property.

activities generally and customarily recognized as essential to such facilities in a
medical center.”).
147. Id.
148. Id. §§ 3,4.
149. Id. § 5.
150. Id. § 6. Deed restrictions are private contractual limitations on the use of real
property that run with the land, commonly found on parcels of land located in
established neighborhoods in Houston, Texas. Because the city of Houston does not
have zoning requirements that restrict the use of land by city ordinance, many
neighborhoods rely on deed restrictions to ensure that the residential character of
lots in neighborhoods is preserved.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 6(a); TEX. PROP. CODE. § 21.021(a) (2005).
153. TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.021(a) (2005). This judicial process is designed simply
to assess the value of the land, not the basis on which TMC has the takings power.
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3. Preliminary analysis of accountability mechanisms
The statutory restrictions on TMC’s eminent domain power
are minimal at best, especially in comparison to those of the second
case study, DNI. Moreover, the restrictions do not lead to the sort of
accountability that is constitutionally mandated by the Private NonDelegation Doctrine such that an abusive exercise of the takings
power, as occurred in the Houston neighborhood, will not take place.
There is no direct or indirect accountability to the electorate or to
affected populations. Indeed, TMC is a privately-run non-profit
organization with a privately-appointed board of directors that
154
remains largely anonymous to the public and to the electorate.
For instance, the reversion interest to the original landowner that
is mandated if TMC does not use land seized by eminent domain for
155
medical care, teaching, research, or ancillary or service purposes is
a restriction on TMC’s takings power, but yields no accountability to
anyone. The reversion of land occurs only after: (1) the taking has
taken place, and (2) time has elapsed to indicate that TMC will not
use the acquired land in accordance with the statutorily mandated
restriction on its use. Therefore, TMC may still fundamentally
exercise the public power of eminent domain in a way that benefits
the organization to the detriment of the public or a community, until
it chooses not to use the property for a particular purpose.
Nonetheless, this restriction on the use of seized land may be selfdefeating, given that there is no time limit included in the statute as
to when reversion may take place, once TMC has failed to comply
with the purpose of the seized land. Does reversion take place after
30 days, months, years, etc.? Therefore, what statutory restrictions on
TMC’s eminent domain power that may have been contemplated in
the statute with respect to reversion are negated by the lack of a time
requirement regarding when a purpose is unfulfilled and when
reversion must occur.
Moreover, the notice requirements in the statute that become
effective once TMC decides to pursue condemnation or even to
purchase real property for an intended use that does not accord with
156
private deed restrictions, are helpful in that they alert surrounding
154. For instance, information on board members is publicly unavailable on
guidestar.org, a public interest website that tracks non-profit organizations and lists
the board members of many non-profit organizations. GuideStar.org, http://www.
guidestar.org/pqShowGsReport.do?np. oID+14224 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007)
155. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 5 (2005).
156. Id. § 6.
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landowners, as well as the owner of targeted property, to potentially
incompatible uses of real property. The notice requirements may
also help neighborhoods and individuals to mount and to mobilize a
potential political solution to the use of eminent domain or the
purchase of real property by TMC. While this recent amendment to
the TMC enabling statute may be considered welcome relief to
landowners in an area targeted for exercise of eminent domain
power, the fact remains that while TMC may give notice, it may also
ultimately exercise its delegated right to eminent domain, regardless
of the interests of a neighboring community. Thus, this notice
restriction does not also provide the sort of accountability that would
place TMC’s delegated takings power in line with the Texas Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine.
In addition, the third statutory restriction on TMC’s use of the
takings power, regarding the mandate that a condemnation hearing
be held and three commissioners be appointed to assess the value of
157
the land taken by TMC, is similarly unavailing. At the point that a
condemnation hearing is held, the only purpose of the proceeding
and appointment of the commissioners is to determine the
compensation that should be awarded a landowner whose property
158
has been seized. This hearing does not contemplate the hearing of
arguments related to the constitutionality of the delegation of
eminent domain power to TMC under the Texas Private NonDelegation Doctrine or even under traditional Takings and Public
Use clauses jurisprudence under the state or the federal
159
Constitution.
Further, the restrictions on TMC’s takings power in the enabling
legislation actually serve to make the non-profit less accountable to
the public than it already is when wielding the very public power of
eminent domain. For instance, the statute authorizes that TMC may
exercise eminent domain power for ancillary or service purposes
160
related to medical care, teaching, and/or research.
However, the
statute does not include any statutory limitations or definitions of
what constitutes an ancillary or service purpose that would merit the
use of eminent domain. Therefore, because these terms remain
undefined, arguably any purpose for the use of the seized land,
regardless of how much it may conflict with the desires of the public
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra notes 144, 152-53 and accompanying text.
TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.021(a) (2005).
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 5 (2005).
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or a community, may be used to justify the organization’s exercise of
eminent domain. These self-interested purposes could ostensibly
include parking or recreational facilities in a particular area in which
TMC was able to acquire real property at relatively low market rates,
such as what happened in the Houston neighborhood, TMC’s most
161
These acquisitions are in
recent exercise of eminent domain.
comparison to alternative sites with potentially higher costs but lower
indices of social and public disruption.
Moreover, the enabling statute arguably allows TMC to be a virtual
property Pac-Man, gobbling up land via the takings power, that is
162
ever contiguous or adjacent to its previously acquired property.
Therefore, as the non-profit attains property, either through outright
purchase of land through negotiations with a landowner or through
use of the coercive power of eminent domain, real estate next to this
property is then at risk or is under statutory threat of being seized.
The effect of this statutory permissiveness is to provide TMC with
almost blank-check authority to exercise or to threaten to exercise
eminent domain powers on land that is located near any of its
property, regardless of the location of the land, how it is currently
being used, and future plans for its use by TMC.
Finally, even if TMC does not use its power of eminent domain
delegated to it by the Texas legislature, by virtue of its having the
power under the enabling statute, private property covenants
restricting the use of the land, or deed restrictions, acquired by TMC
163
are effectively extinguished.
The effect of this statutory
permissiveness, therefore, appears to be just the sort that potentially
provides a breeding ground for opportunities by private non-profit
actors to use the mere threat of eminent domain authority in selfinterested ways and that ignores the interests of the larger public and
community in contravention of the Texas Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine.

161. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
162. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 §§ 2,4 (2005).
163. See Letter from Robert B. Neblett III of Jackson Walker L.L.P. to Andrew
Icken, Executive Vice President of TMC (Jan. 21, 2005) (“At your request we have set
forth below a legal explanation of how the Texas Medical Center’s (“TMC”)
acquisition of real property located within the Central City subdivision of Houston
(the “Property”) has extinguished any applicable deed restrictions. . . .Furthermore,
the fact that some of the Property was acquired by purchase, instead of
condemnation, does not affect the outcome. The deed restrictions are nonetheless
terminated by TMC’s acquisition.”) in reference to the private deed restrictions in
the Houston neighborhood in which TMC exercised the takings power delegated to
it to build a parking garage prohibited by the restrictions.
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B. Case Study Two: Dudley Neighbors, Inc./Dudley Neighborhood Street
Initiative
As a counterpoint to the enabling legislation in the TMC example,
the delegating statute in the Dudley Neighbors, Inc. (“DNI”) case
study includes a number of accountability controls that permit the
delegation of the takings power to conform to the constitutional
164
demands of the Massachusetts Private Non-Delegation Doctrine.
Therefore, the DNI example provides a model for state legislatures
that have already delegated the takings power to private, non-profit
corporations or that are contemplating the delegation.
1. History
Dudley Neighbors, Inc. (“DNI”), is the eminent domain arm of the
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (“DSNI”), a Boston,
Massachusetts community group with the mission of revitalizing the
long-neglected Dudley neighborhood in the Roxbury/North
165
Dorchester section of Boston.
When DSNI was formed in 1984,
there were 1,300 trash-filled empty property lots in the Dudley
166
neighborhood. In particular, DNI is a non-profit urban community
167
land trust. Its charge has been to use the takings power to assemble
disparate parcels of primarily vacant land in the Dudley Triangle
168
section of the neighborhood to construct affordable housing. For
instance, in the early 1990s, DNI used eminent domain on 132 vacant
parcels of land that were eventually used to build 134 affordable169
housing units for residents of the neighborhood.
Subsequently,
164. See DiLoreto v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d 612, 614-15 (Mass. 1981)
(stating that “‘It is well established in this Commonwealth and elsewhere, that the
Legislature cannot delegate the general power to make laws, conferred upon it by a
constitution like that of Massachusetts’") (citing Brodbine v. Revere, 66 N.E. 607
(Mass. 1903); Opinion of the Justices, 105 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 1952); Opinion of the
Justices, 19 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. 1939)). DiLoreto further noted that “[d]elegation of
legislative power to private parties has sometimes been held to violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States,” but it reiterated that in Massachusetts private delegations are constitutional
as long as “proper safeguards” are put into place. Id. at 246 (citing Corning Glass
Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 363 (Mass. 1973).
DUDLEY STREET
165. THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION, PROGRAM PROFILE :
NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE 1 (2000), http://www.practitionerresources.org/cache/
documents/19319.pdf [hereinafter THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION].
166. The Catalogue for Philanthropy, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative,
http://www.catalogueforphilanthropy.org/ma/2005/dudley_street_5605.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Catalogue for Philanthropy].
167. THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION, supra note 165, at 13.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 13-14.
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DNI’s eminent domain power has been used to seize land for
additional homes, a greenhouse for Dudley residents, gardens, and
170
parks.
2. Mechanics of accountability mechanisms in DNI’s enabling legislation
The relevant Massachusetts enabling statute allows an urban
redevelopment corporation, including a charitable corporation, to
take land by eminent domain, provided that certain extensive
procedures, ostensibly designed to foment accountability in the
171
Massachusetts courts view urban
takings process, are followed.
redevelopment corporations, although some may be technically
classified as for-profit corporations, as more akin to public service or
charitable corporations because they are designed to benefit the
172
public.
The first step is that the Boston Redevelopment Authority (“BRA”)
must delegate to DNI the power of eminent domain, a power that has
173
already been delegated to BRA. Second, DNI, or any other urban
redevelopment corporation formed pursuant to the statute, must be
engaged in revitalizing blighted areas of certain communities in
174
Massachusetts. Third, before DNI may undertake a project, before
the exercise of eminent domain power is even contemplated, it must
receive approval from both the planning board and the city council
175
of the city of Boston, following a public hearing on the issue.
Notice for the public hearing must be published on at least two
occasions, no earlier than fourteen days before the date of a hearing,
in a newspaper of general circulation and posted in a conspicuous
176
place in Boston. The enabling statute then requires that a second
form of mailed notice be given to all landowners who are within or
177
abut a proposed project.
In addition, the planning board must submit a report, within fortyfive days of the public hearing that includes an analysis of details such
170. Catalogue for Philanthropy, supra note 166.
171. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, §§ 3, 11 (2006).
172. Opinion of the Justices, 135 N.E.2d 665, 667, 334 (Mass. 1956).
173. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 3 (2006); see also The Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative Website, www.dsni.org/dni/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2007); THE
ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION, supra note 165, at 13.; Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1075
(1996).
174. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 3 (2006).
175. Id. § 6.
176. Id. § 6B.
177. Id. § 6.
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as whether or not the area is blighted and how the proposed
178
The report
redevelopment comports with the city’s master plan.
must also include a recommendation to approve or to disapprove a
179
project to the city council.
The city council, in turn, is then
charged with submitting a report that approves or disapproves a
project to the mayor, within ninety days of the public hearing and
within forty-five days of the council’s receipt of the planning board’s
180
report.
Furthermore, both reports must be written and made
available to the public, including copies sent by certified mail to those
181
individuals who were notified of the public hearing. Moreover, any
person “aggrieved by the approval or disapproval of a project” has
sixty days within the time that the city council has transmitted its
182
report to the mayor to seek recourse in the courts.
Another accountability check on the use of eminent domain power
by DNI or other urban redevelopment corporations in Massachusetts
is that a project must provide a means, for persons or families who
are displaced by the exercise of the power to be provided in the site
or in an equivalent area the following three items: (1) a place to live
that is similar in rent to the displaced dwelling; (2) is “reasonably
accessible” to their places of employment; and (3) is safe, decent, and
183
accessible to public utilities, shopping, and public transportation. A
project may not be approved by the planning board or city council if
contingency plans for displaced families and individuals through the
184
use of eminent domain are not included.
A final accountability control on the exercise of the takings power
by DNI is that once a project is approved by the planning board and
city council, a certificate is issued to BRA. BRA then makes a third,
185
separate and final determination of a project’s approval.
3. Accountability controls inherent in DNI’s and DSNI’s organizational
structure
The significant statutory accountability mechanisms in the
enabling statute of the DNI have the effect of mitigating any
conflicting interests of DNI and the public or the surrounding
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 6C.
Id. § 6.
Id.
Id. §§ 3, 6; see Taylor, supra note 173, at 1076.
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community. In addition, there are a number of accountability
controls inherent in the pure organizational structure of DNI and of
its parent organization, DSNI, that further soften any divergent
interests and tamp down a potential abusive exercise of the takings
power by DNI. For instance, DNI is governed by an eleven-member
board of directors, six of whom are appointed by DSNI and one each
appointed by the mayor of Boston, the Roxbury Neighborhood
Council, the city council member for the district, and the state
186
senator and state house representative for the neighborhood.
DSNI, the parent organization of DNI, is in turn governed by a
twenty-nine-seat board of directors, fourteen of whom are residents
(both adults and youth) of the Dudley neighborhood, with the
remaining board members representing seven other non-profit
agencies, two community churches, two neighborhood businesses,
187
and two community development organizations.
Except for two
seats on DSNI’s board of directors, all directors are elected by Dudley
188
neighborhood residents.
4.

Preliminary analysis of accountability mechanisms

The main concern of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine in
general, and with respect to the private delegation of the very public
eminent domain power to non-profit and charitable corporations, in
particular, is that these entities will exercise the takings power in a
self-interested, abusive manner to the detriment and to the exclusion
of the public interest and in violation of a state’s constitution.
Opportunities for this manner of exercise are ripe for non-profits
delegated the takings power in enabling statutes that do not contain
certain controls, such as the electoral accountability that exists when
189
As applied to
elected government exercises the takings power.
DNI, however, this central focus of the Massachusetts Private NonDelegation Doctrine is significantly diminished by the wide-ranging
accountability mechanisms inherent in the enabling statute and in
the organizational structures of DNI and DSNI.
For instance, in the DNI enabling legislation, there is
accountability to elected officials for an exercise of eminent domain
at almost every level of local government. Indeed, approval for a
186. THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION, supra note 165, at 11.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the electoral
consequences of elected officials’ authorization of eminent domain power).
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project must be received by the planning board, the city council, and
BRA, all public or quasi-public entities who are either directly or
indirectly accountable to voters. Moreover, even though a project
does not necessarily require the approval of the mayor, he or she
receives the city council’s recommendation for a particular project.
Therefore, Boston’s mayor may ostensibly intervene politically should
a particular taking and redevelopment project prove sensitive.
Furthermore, the statutory regime calls for a number of
opportunities for the public interest to be heard, given that the law
requires that there be a joint public hearing between the city council
and planning boards and that affected property owners be given at
least three kinds of notice for the hearing. The regime also includes
an appeal that aggrieved property owners may use to have their say in
the courts. Most importantly, when it comes to the use of eminent
domain power by DNI or similar urban redevelopment corporations,
the process requires that redevelopment projects may not be
approved by the city’s planning board if there are no relocation plans
for affected residents or landowners.
These numerous statutory accountability processes in the exercise
of eminent domain power by DNI serve as checks on the selfinterested and abusive use of the takings power by the organization.
They are also reinforced by the similar accountability mechanisms in
the organizational structures of DNI and DSNI. For instance, five
members of DNI’s board of directors are selected by elected
representatives at all levels of state and local government. Should
these representatives approve a taking that is contrary to the Dudley
community’s will, then presumably the elected officials responsible
for their selection may be held accountable on Election Day.
Furthermore, the remaining six directors of DNI are selected by
DSNI, of which twenty-seven of its directors are selected by the
residents of the Dudley neighborhood and of which fourteen must be
residents of the community.
These six directors of DNI are therefore held at least indirectly
accountable for their vote to use eminent domain power by the
ostensibly affected residents of its exercise. Organizational controls
call for the Dudley community to be in ultimate control of the use of
eminent domain power by DNI, in great contrast to the
190
organizational regime in the TMC example.

190. See supra Part IV.A & IV.B.
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Yet another foundational and historical check on the use of
eminent domain power by DNI is that its parent organization, DSNI,
was borne out of efforts by the community, in partnership with a local
191
foundation, to improve the neighborhood. Thus, to the extent that
DNI uses its privately delegated takings power, the communityfocused roots of DSNI inform DNI’s actions by essentially forcing it to
use its power in ways with which the community will agree. Even
though DNI’s actions may be deemed self-interested because they
benefit the community, in keeping with DNI and DSNI’s mission,
they are wholly disinterested because one particular person or private
192
party is not benefiting—it is the entire Dudley neighborhood.
C. Application of the Modified Texas Boll Weevil Test to TMC and to DNI
1.

TMC
a.

Applying the Modified Texas Boll Weevil Test to TMC

The first two parts of the initial three-part inquiry of the modified
Texas Boll Weevil test certainly arrive at the conclusion that TMC, as a
non-profit, charitable corporation, is a clear private actor that has
193
In
been delegated the very public power of eminent domain.
addition, under the modified eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, the
delegation of the takings power to TMC in the current version of the

191. Taylor, supra note 173, at 1078-79.
192. David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead! (Long Live Eminent Domain!), BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/
articles/2006/04/16/eminent_domain_is_dead_long_live_eminent_domain?mode=.
In this Article, Professor Barron, a professor of state and local government and
constitutional law at Harvard Law School, wrote that “[e]minent domain is one tool
for improving the conditions of neighborhoods. One of our own area’s most
successful community development organizations the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative, for example, lobbied to be given the power of eminent domain in the
1980s so it could revive a long-depressed neighborhood in Roxbury. By taking
privately owned abandoned property, and developing housing in its place, the
private community group was able to do just that.” Id. In keeping with the
accountability mechanisms that satisfy the demands of the Massachusetts Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine, Professor Barron further states in the article that “[r]ather
than banning eminent domain for economic development. . . .we should focus on
reforms that would ensure the communities in which it is so often used have a say in
the planning process. That means ensuring those who are least likely to have a voice
in economic redevelopment get one.” Id.
193. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 475
(Tex. 1994).
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enabling statute is unconstitutional under Texas’ Private NonDelegation Doctrine.
For example, under the modified Texas Boll Weevil test, there is
little, if any, meaningful government review of an exercise of eminent
194
domain power by TMC.
While the enabling statute permits an
aggrieved landowner to have a formal hearing about the contested
parcel of land, this hearing is simply to assess the value of the
property by three commissioners appointed by the county, not to
195
contest the constitutionality of the delegating legislation.
Other
than this hearing by the judicial branch, however, no other branch of
government, state agency, or branch of municipal or county
government has the power to review an exercise of eminent domain
power by TMC.
This lack of governmental oversight is even more telling, given that
even when TMC acquires property though direct purchase, any deed
restrictions, or contractual restrictions on the use of land that run
with the land are extinguished, simply by virtue of this private, non196
profit’s eminent domain power. Thus, that TMC’s power is hardly
subject to government review, much less meaningful review, appears
to weigh “heavily” against the delegation of eminent domain power to
it, much like the result of the application of this element of the
original Texas Boll Weevil test to private landowners delegated the
197
power to control water quality in FM Properties.
In addition, this
result is in marked contrast to that found with respect to DNI, a
delegation that includes copious amounts of direct and indirect
198
meaningful government review.
Moreover, under the modified version of the Texas Boll Weevil test,
the issue of whether or not affected persons by a taking are
adequately represented in the process to seize the property, similarly
weighs against the delegation to TMC. While affected persons in the
DNI case study, both landowners and residents, are seemingly
represented to a large extent and exert influence in a decision by
DNI to use the takings power, persons affected by a similar decision
199
by TMC have little or no representation.

194. See supra Parts IV.A.2 & IV.A.3.
195. TEX. PROP. CODE. § 21.021(a) (2005).
196. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 107-10 (for an analysis of the application of the original Texas
Boll Weevil test in FM Properties).
198. See supra Part IV.B.
199. See supra Parts IV.A & IV.B.
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Arguably, however, the recent amendment to the Texas enabling
legislation that mandates that affected landowners be notified via
certified mail, should the organization purchase or acquire property
through eminent domain for a purpose that would not comport with
private deed restrictions, is a step in the direction of providing
affected persons more representation in the decision-making
200
process. For instance, this notice would ostensibly permit aggrieved
parties, who may be affected either by the taking of land or a use of
land that is incompatible with its historical use and current
surroundings of the property, to use political activism to compel
representation and perhaps influence in TMC’s decision-making
process. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a community
could accomplish this aim, and there is no certainty attached to its
results, unlike with the Massachusetts enabling legislation.
Therefore, this element of the revised Texas test weighs against the
delegation of eminent domain power to TMC.
The portion of the modified Texas test examining whether or not
the private delegate has a pecuniary or personal interest in the
exercise of eminent domain power, also weighs against holding the
delegation of the takings power to TMC constitutional under Texas’
Private Non-Delegation Doctrine. For instance, unlike DNI, a private,
non-profit corporation that is heavily rooted in the community and is
controlled to a large extent by the residents of the Dudley
neighborhood, TMC’s organizational structure as a privately shielded
and privately governed non-profit land management and parking
concern to its member institutions inherently serves to create a clash
of interest with communities. This conflict of interests is only
enhanced by the fact that TMC’s board of directors is hidden from
view and is likely unaffiliated with communities affected by statutorily
delegated takings power.
Proof of this clash is found in the sole instance in which TMC used
eminent domain and outright purchase to acquire real property in a
Houston-area neighborhood to construct a multi-level parking
garage. This parking facility was prohibited under the covenants that
limited land use in the neighborhood to residential, single-family
201
homes. Furthermore, despite the fact that the organization used its
202
power of eminent domain for only one parcel of land, and acquired
the other parcels of land for the parking garage through outright
200. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 6 (2005).
201. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
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purchase, TMC still “used” its eminent domain power to
automatically extinguish the private land covenants, or deed
restrictions, on the purchased parcels that restricted the use of the
203
property.
Thus, as in FM Properties, this clash of interests between
not only TMC and a targeted landowner, but also a surrounding
204
community, weighs “heavily” against the delegation of power.
The final part of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test in the eminent
domain context involves assessing whether or not the private
205
delegation is limited in “duration, extent, and subject matter.”
As
applied to TMC, this element similarly weighs against the delegation
of eminent domain power to it. For instance, the enabling statute
permits TMC to acquire property through eminent domain and
therefore to extinguish private deed restrictions in adjacent
communities in perpetuity. There is little restriction on when TMC’s
206
delegated power of eminent domain terminates.
The sole
limitation on any duration of TMC’s exercise of the takings power
occurs after the power has been exercised, in which real property will
revert to the original owner if the entity does not use it for the
207
purposes designated in the enabling statute.
Furthermore, in
contrast to the larger purpose of revitalizing the Dudley
neighborhood for which DNI may use seized land, the purposes for
which TMC may use taken land are extremely broad. These purposes
also do not necessarily fit within a larger goal of community
development. They range from the building of medical facilities
used for teaching, research, and patient care purposes to ancillary or
service purposes such as parking, a garbage dump, or even attractive
208
landscaping.
Moreover, TMC is authorized to use its statutorily delegated takings
power on any real property that is adjacent to or contiguous to its
209
existing property, however the property was acquired.
Thus, the
use of eminent domain power to acquire one parcel of property
would then justify the exercise of the takings power on adjacent land
sites, permitting a seemingly endless use of eminent domain and
infringement upon applicable land covenants. Therefore, in stark
203. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 107-10 (explaining the application of the original Texas Boll
Weevil test in FM Properties).
205. See Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,
472 (referencing the sixth factor of the original Texas test).
206. See supra Parts IV.A.2 & IV.A.3.
207. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 § 5 (2005).
208. See supra notes 141 & 145-46 and accompanying text.
209. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 3183b-1 §§ 2,4 (2005).
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divergence from the delegation of eminent domain power to DNI,
that limits an exercise of the power to the Dudley neighborhood as
210
long as BRA permits and it is for revitalization purposes only, the
duration, extent, and subject matter of TMC’s delegation is extremely
broad in scope and weighs against the delegation under the Texas Boll
Weevil test. Thus, all four elements of the modified Texas test weigh
against the constitutionality of the delegation of eminent domain
power to TMC under the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine in Texas,
including two that weigh “heavily” against the delegation under the
Texas Supreme Court’s holding in FM Properties.
b. Applying the original Texas Boll Weevil test to TMC
Even under a more comprehensive approach of an application of
the Texas test, encompassing the remaining elements of the original
Texas Boll Weevil test, the delegation of eminent domain power to
TMC still would be unconstitutional under the Texas constitution.
For instance, while TMC, in its application of the takings power, does
not make rules or apply the law to particular individuals, it also is not
empowered to define criminal acts or to impose criminal sanctions
on recalcitrant landowners, two elements, respectively, of the original
211
test. Thus, the latter factor weighs in favor of the delegation. On
the other hand, it is also apparent that TMC is not specially qualified
212
or trained to exercise eminent domain power, given that its primary
role is as a land management company, not purveyor of eminent
domain power, in stark contrast to DNI. Furthermore, the Texas
legislature provided little, if any standards that would guide a more
disinterested use of eminent domain power by TMC, another
213
element of the original Texas Boll Weevil test.
Combining these
results with those of the application of the modified test, a numerical
tally indicates that a majority of the factors still weighs against the
delegation of the takings power to TMC in the current enabling
legislation.

210. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
211. These are the third and fifth factors, respectively, of the original Texas Boll
Weevil test. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,
472 (Tex. 1994).
212. This element references the seventh element of the original Texas Boll Weevil
test. Id.
213. This element refers to the eighth factor of the Texas Boll Weevil test. Id.
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DNI
a. Applying the Texas Boll Weevil Test to DNI

Under the modified Texas Boll Weevil test, the delegation of
eminent domain power by the Massachusetts legislature to DNI, the
Boston-based, private, non-profit corporation, would likely be
deemed constitutional under Massachusetts’ Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine. For example, the analysis under the modified Texas test
for private delegations of eminent domain power proposed in this
Article begins with an initial two-part inquiry as to: (1) whether or
not traditionally governmental, coercive powers, i.e. public powers,
have been delegated; and (2) whether or not these public powers
have been delegated to a private entity that rests outside the
traditional constitutional categories of private entities delegated the
power of eminent domain, such as common carriers, including
railroad companies and public utilities. By virtue of its being
delegated the power of eminent domain, a traditionally
governmental power that is coercive because it can force a landowner
to relinquish her real property irrespective of her wishes, DNI has
accordingly been delegated a public power. Moreover, DNI is not a
common carrier that would fall within the traditional permissible
private eminent domain categories—it is a private, non-profit
company, albeit with a sizeable community influence over it.
The next step in the application of the modified eight-part Texas
Boll Weevil test to DNI is an analysis pursuant to the following
214
factors: (1) whether or not there is meaningful government review
of a private delegate’s actions by “a state agency or other branch of
state government,” (2) whether or not individuals who are affected
by the delegate’s actions have adequate representation in the
delegate’s “decision making process,” (3) assessing the private
delegate’s economic and/or personal interest, and (4) analyzing
whether or not the delegation is “narrow in duration, extent, and
215
subject matter.”

214. See supra Part III.D.1 (advocating a limitation of the Texas Boll Weevil test to
these four factors, respectively factors one, two, four, and six of the original Texas Boll
Weevil test, but also recognizing that this limitation may not address the
particularities of divers enabling legislation that delegate the takings power to private
entities).
215. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472
(Tex. 1994).
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With respect to the issue of whether or not there is meaningful
government review as applied to DNI, it is apparent that this factor
weighs in favor of the constitutionality of the delegation of the
takings power to DNI under Massachusetts’ Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine. The Massachusetts enabling statute allows for at least five
levels of government review by a state agency or other branch of state
216
government. For instance, both the city council and the planning
board must approve a project of DNI, encompassing two levels of
217
review by state government. BRA, the delegating entity of eminent
domain power to DNI, must then perform a tertiary review of the
218
project and then approve or disapprove it. Fourth, with respect to
the specific use of eminent domain power by DNI, the Massachusetts
enabling statute requires that, unless reasonable contingency plans
are made by DNI for any residents displaced by eminent domain,
then the city council and the planning board may not approve the
219
redevelopment project.
Finally, a fifth level of direct government
review is that anyone, within sixty days of the city council’s having
approved or disapproved a project in its report to the mayor, has the
220
statutory right to seek review by the state courts.
Not only, however, does the enabling legislation for DNI and
similarly situated community development corporations in
Massachusetts allow for multiple levels of government review by a
number of branches and offices of government, but also the
particular organizational structure of DNI’s board of directors serves
as an indirect source of government review on the takings plans of
DNI. For instance, four out of the eleven board members of DNI are
selected by the mayor, city council representative, state house
representative, and state senate representative for the Dudley
221
neighborhood.
Hence, if a particular taking proves controversial,
then the members of DNI’s board appointed by elected officials,
presumably before approving a project, would likely vote in a manner
not inconsistent with electoral forces, allowing these officials to stay
in elected office. Therefore, the five levels of direct government
review by varied branches and offices, in addition to the indirect
government review by a number of different elected offices, ensure

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 3 (2006).
Id. § 6.
Id. §§ 3,6.
Id. § 6.
Id. § 6(c).
THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION, supra note 165, at 11.
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that the meaningful government review portion of the modified Texas
Boll Weevil test is satisfied.
Moreover, with respect to the issue of whether or not affected
persons by a private delegate’s actions are adequately represented in
the delegate’s decision-making process, it appears that this inquiry
similarly satisfies the requirements of the Texas Boll Weevil test and
ultimately, the demands of the Massachusetts version of the Private
Non-Delegation Doctrine. Three of these ways are direct, and one is
indirect. First, the enabling state statute requires that two types of
notice be sent to any landowner whose land is adjacent to a project
not more than fourteen days in advance of the joint public hearing of
222
the city council and planning board. Second, the landowners have
an opportunity, in advance of a project’s approval by the city council
and the city’s planning board, to voice their concerns and to be
heard before the decision-makers. Third, the fact that contingency
plans must be erected for any resident affected by a project that
involves the taking of land, necessarily implies that affected residents’
interests are taken into account in a project that involves eminent
223
domain.
Fourth, an indirect way in which affected persons are
represented in DNI’s decision-making process is that Dudley
neighborhood residents, whether or not landowners, essentially elect
224
six out of DNI’s eleven directors. Neighborhood residents elect the
vast majority of the directors of DSNI, which then chooses six of
225
Therefore, because affected landowners
DNI’s board members.
and residents have four levels of representation in DNI, this element
of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test also weighs in favor of the
constitutionality of the delegation of the takings power to DNI under
Massachusetts’ Private Non-Delegation Doctrine.
With respect to the part of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test that
addresses the private delegate’s economic or personal interest
regarding the exercise of the takings power, it is similarly apparent
that this factor also weighs in favor of constitutionality of the
delegation of eminent domain power to DNI. In DNI, the interests of
it and the community at large, including landowners and residents,
are intertwined. For example, DNI’s stated charge, which then
necessarily guides its interest, is to assemble and to develop vacant
land parcels in the Dudley neighborhood of Boston, for the purpose
222.
223.
224.
225.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 6 (2006).
Id.
THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION, supra note 165, at 11.
Id.
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of primarily constructing affordable housing for its residents.
Indeed, the Massachusetts enabling statute mandates that the core of
227
DNI’s mission be revitalization. Therefore, while DNI may arguably
have a self-interested motive to achieve its core mission, this mission
and interest is inherently guided and tempered by the community.
Thus, there is little conflict with DNI’s interest and the larger interest
of the Dudley neighborhood and the public.
An analysis of whether or not the delegation is narrow in scope also
responds favorably to the question of whether or not the delegation
of the takings power to DNI is constitutional under the Private NonDelegation Doctrine of Massachusetts. For instance, while there is no
technical limit on the duration of the eminent domain power of DNI,
presumably there is a practical limit on it, given that there is only a
certain amount of land that may be revitalized in the neighborhood.
Moreover, DNI’s power is statutorily limited by BRA’s delegation of
228
eminent domain power to it.
BRA could presumably revoke the
power that it has delegated once DNI’s mission of revitalizing the
neighborhood has been accomplished. In addition, DNI is limited to
exercising eminent domain power within the confines of the Dudley
neighborhood, and it can only act to use this power in revitalizing the
area. Consequently, DNI is limited in content and subject matter,
and this fourth element weighs in favor of the constitutionality of the
delegation.
While recognizing that the previously discussed four elements of
the modified Texas Boll Weevil test are likely most important with
respect to the delegation of eminent domain power to private, nonprofit actors, this Article is also cognizant that other elements of the
original eight-part Texas test may be invoked in any number of
statutes that delegate the takings power to these non-traditional
229
private actors of eminent domain. Therefore, for purposes of being
as comprehensive as possible, this Article will also undertake analysis
of DNI pursuant to the remaining elements of the original Texas Boll
Weevil test.
First, with respect to the element of the original test encompassing
whether or not the “private delegate’s power is limited to making
230
rules” or simply applying the law to particular individuals, it would
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 13-14.
MASS. GEN.LAWS. ch. 121A, § 3 (2006).
Id.
See supra Part III.A.
Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
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appear that this element is inconclusive as applied to DNI and its
statutorily delegated eminent domain power. DNI’s delegation
involves neither making rules nor applying the law to certain persons.
Second, the inquiry weighs in favor of the delegation because DNI
does not have the power to define criminal acts or to impose criminal
sanctions, another element of the original Texas test. Third, the
Texas test similarly weighs in favor of the constitutionality of DNI’s
delegation of the takings power, as DNI was specifically created to
assemble vacant land for the DSNI using eminent domain authority,
231
and arguably it has special qualifications to exercise the power.
Finally, with respect to the element of whether or not the legislature
has provided adequate standards to the private delegate in the
original Texas test, the Massachusetts legislature and BRA directly
and indirectly have provided standards that guide DNI in the exercise
of its taking power. For example, they have mandated that DNI’s
takings power may only be exercised for the revitalization of the
Dudley neighborhood and that any exercise of the takings power that
impinges on residents be counter-balanced with contingency plans
232
for them.
V. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
A. A Range of Proposals
As exemplified by the TMC example, when private non-profits
exercise the takings power with little or no controls that hold them
accountable to the electorate, there is an increased opportunity for
abuses of the highly coercive eminent domain power. Short of
advocating a per se rule against the delegation of eminent domain
power to private, non-profit and charitable corporations, this Article
proposes a number of statutory regimes that state legislatures may
consider in order to permit the delegation to survive constitutional
muster under a Private Non-Delegation Doctrine test such as the one
constructed by the Texas Supreme Court in the Texas Boll Weevil case.
Ultimately, the practical effect of these statutory solutions is to
increase the accountability of a private non-profit corporation that
has been delegated the takings power, and, as a corollary, to lessen
the chance of an abusive exercise of the takings power caused by
divergent interests between the public and the private delegate. In
231. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 174 & 183-84 and accompanying text.
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addition, this Article advocates taking a more comprehensive
approach to these statutory solutions, ensuring that a number of
accountability safeguards are included in legislation, as in the
Massachusetts/DNI case, rather than just a single safeguard. It is also
important to remember that, some legislatures, upon a re-visiting of
existing legislation or legislative proposals, may simply forgo a
delegation at all, given the constitutional outcome of the delegation
under a test similar to a Texas Boll Weevil analysis.
First, an obvious statutory solution is one that is included in the
enabling legislation for the DNI case, as well as suggested by the
amended and original versions of the Texas Boll Weevil test. This
solution involves inclusion of statutory provisions that mandate that
an exercise of eminent domain by a private charitable corporation be
approved by a state agency, a state legislature, or even several offices
of state and local government. The preference, however, is that
officials who are directly elected by the voting populace must approve
233
a takings exercise. For instance, in the case of DNI, a development
project must be approved by three levels of local government: (1)
the Boston city council, (2) the city’s planning board, and (3) BRA.
Furthermore, the idea of ensuring that a private actor’s taking
power is submitted for review by a governmental office is not unheard
of. Indeed, when public utilities or railroads that have been
delegated the takings power choose to exercise it, they must often
234
seek approval from a branch of state government. In addition, the
provisions allowing for an official who is directly elected to approve
an exercise of the takings power by a private, charitable corporation
serve as further assurance that the private delegate will not engage in
unaccountable abusive action.
A second legislative solution is to include a damages provision in
the enabling legislation of the delegation for an affected landowner
or resident that is harmed by an exercise of the takings power by a
233. In Virginia, for example, the Jamestown-Yorktown foundation, a public
foundation created by the state to preserve the historical quarters of the original
Jamestown settlement, has the power of eminent domain in order to take property
that would advance its historical mission, but any exercise of the eminent domain
power must be approved by the governor, a directly elected official. VA. CODE ANN. §
23-288 (West 2006).
234. See, e.g., supra notes 23-41 (noting the requirement for state agency approval
for an exercise of the takings power by a public utility); see also Lawrence, supra note
4, at 686 (discussing that “but many states have imposed additional procedural
requirements on private condemners alone. Frequently statutes require private
condemners to secure the approval of a state agency before initiating the
condemnation action, and the agency may investigate the particular project quite
closely to assure that it furthers the public interest.”).
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235

non-profit corporation.
This largely economic remedy would go
above and beyond any compensation paid to landowners for the
value of their seized land. In the case of business owners, the
damages provision could include the loss of goodwill and business
losses. The damages could also extend to affected residents, who may
not be landowners, but who are residential or commercial
leaseholders. Similarly, damages could be extended to individuals in
a community who are affected by a private, non-profit corporation’s
236
incompatible use of seized land in an area.
A third approach is to mandate standard procedures, such as
public hearings to which affected parties such as landowners,
residents, community groups, and representatives of the private, nonprofit corporation would be invited and given reasonable time and
notice to air their views publicly about a proposed exercise of the
takings power by the private non-profit. The hearings could be held
directly before an elected body that will approve or disapprove an
exercise of the takings delegation, such as in the DNI example.
Hearings could also be conducted before an advisory body or state
agency that will provide recommendations for action to elected
officials who must provide final approval of an exercise of the takings
power.
Moreover, not only could these hearings be used to air potentially
opposing points of view related to a private non-profit’s exercise of
eminent domain power, but also they could be used to evaluate and
to provide oversight of the charitable corporation’s actions with
respect to ways in which it has dealt with affected persons in the
community and for its plans for the seized land. An example of this
sort of oversight is also found in the DNI example, in which
contingency plans for residents and landowners affected by DNI’s use
of eminent domain must be included in order for the city council
and planning board to approve a revitalization project. Nonetheless,
both types of hearings would likely add a veneer of fairness to an
exercise of the takings power by a private non-profit corporation,
especially one that is privately governed by a board of directors and
that is shielded from public scrutiny, such as in the TMC case.

235. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 691-92 (noting that “[o]ccasionally, a damages
remedy might be a safeguard”); see also Professor Linda Crane, John Marshall Univ.
Sch. of Law, Address in response to this Paper at the 2006 annual meeting of the
Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference (June 3, 2006).
236. See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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Still a fourth statutory solution, that would counter-balance the
effects of private board of directors’ discussions and meetings
concerning eminent domain that are largely held out of public view,
is one that would mandate that these meetings be subject to a state’s
237
Open Records or Open Meetings Acts.
This type of statutory
provision may allow elected officials, who must approve a private
exercise of eminent domain power, as well as persons affected by its
exercise, to evaluate fully the consequences and justifications of the
exercise.
In keeping with this fourth recommended solution, a fifth proposal
is to ensure that the delegation is subject to a state’s Sunset Act, in
which there would be a time cap placed on the exercise of the takings
238
power of perhaps five to ten years.
This type of provision
specifically addresses whether or not the private actor’s actions are
239
limited in duration.
Yet a sixth solution is to include in enabling legislation that the
exercise of the takings power be subject to a state’s equivalent of the
240
Administrative Procedure Act.
This sort of statutory provision
would treat private, charitable corporations in an equivalent manner
to state agencies that also exercise public, coercive powers, injecting a
level of procedural fairness and accountability into a non-profit’s
exercise of the takings power. It would also have the effect of
mandating consistent, proven procedures in an exercise of eminent
domain power.
B. Social Capital Impact Assessments (“SCIAs”): Opening Up the Process
A seventh legislative solution is to require that private, non-profit
corporations perform a Social Capital Impact Assessment (“SCIA”), a
study that would evaluate the impact of the exercise of the takings
241
power on a community.
The idea of SCIAs largely derives from
Environmental Impact Statements (“EIS”) that are mandated in the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in response to any
237. Reeder, supra note 39, at 220.
238. Id.
239. This concern addresses the sixth factor of the original Texas Boll Weevil test.
Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex.
1994).
240. Id.
241. See Asmara Tekle Johnson, Desperate Cities: Eminent Domain and Economic
Development in a Post-Kelo World, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2007)
(proposing the implementation of Social Capital Impact Assessments when eminent
domain is used for economic development purposes in order to provide increased
public transparency and accountability to these decisions).
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action by a federal agency that may have a significant impact on the
242
A draft EIS must be made available to the public
environment.
early enough in the deliberative process in order for the public to
243
comment meaningfully on an agency’s decision.
An agency must
244
then respond to the public’s comments in a final EIS.
Although criticized for being too time-consuming, expensive, and
245
unduly procedurally-oriented, the EIS process has been highly
successful in opening up the decision-making process of federal
agencies to previously disempowered community and environmental
groups concerning determinations of these agencies that may
246
significantly impact the physical environment.
Indeed, EISs have
been instrumental in forcing the redesign, reconsideration, or even
withdrawal of decisions of federal agencies that severely impact the
247
environment.
The result has been to provide a framework for
public debate concerning environmental decision-making that
248
previously was non-existent.
In the eminent domain arena, SCIAs have been recommended as a
way to involve and to empower oft-neglected community groups and
242. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
243. See Jeannette MacMillan, Note, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in
Domestic Environmental Law:
NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks
(Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 494 (2005);
see also Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2006) (requiring
that once an agency decides that it will undertake an EIS and before it publishes a
draft EIS, it must publish a Notice of Intent that provides public participation in
determining the “scope” of the EIS and significant issues related to it), and
Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2006) (inviting comments
by the public and other agencies.)
244. See Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (2006)
(requiring that the lead agency respond to the public’s comments); see also Brian
Cole et al., Prospects for Health Impact Assessment in the United States: New and Improved
Environmental Impact Assessment or Something Different?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
1153, 1162 (2004).
245. See MacMillan, supra note 243, at 521; see also Cole, supra note 244, at 1163,
1169 (noting that EISs can cost several hundred thousand to several million dollars
and may take an average of one or two years, if not longer, to complete).
246. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205, 207 (1998); see also
MacMillan, supra note 243, at 529.
247. See Caldwell, supra note 246, at 207. For instance, the EIS process was
instrumental in halting projects that affected old-growth forests and the northern
spotted owl. See Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements and Their
Lessons for Social Capital Analysis, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/
sandereisandsklessons.pdf at 2 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005) (citing Mark Bonnet &
Mark Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the Northern
Spotted Owl, ECOLOGY L.Q. 105-71 (1991)), and N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp.
479 (D. Wash. 1988) (halting attempts to log the habitat of the northern spotted owl
after it was declared a threatened species by the Fish & Wildlife Service).
248. Johnson, supra note 241.
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individuals who are impacted by economic development takings
249
using a similar process to EISs in the environmental/NEPA context.
SCIAs could be mandated either through enabling legislation or
through the courts. They would assess the social impact of an
economic development taking on a community by compelling the
response of a governmental entity and its private partners to fourteen
questions that address community concerns. These studies would
also be provided to the public early enough for reasonable notice and
comment by the public. Therefore, the idea is that, as in the
environmental context, economic development takings would
250
similarly be opened up.
The relevant fourteen questions are as
follows:
1. How will the taking or development project disrupt existing
land uses?;
2. How will the taking or development affect neighborhood
integrity?;
3. Will the taking or revitalization project displace and relocate
homes, families, and businesses?;
4. What opposition, if any, exists to the taking or project?;
5. If neighborhood integrity is to be affected or the taking or
revitalization project is to displace homes, families, and businesses,
how can these effects be mitigated?;
6. If displacement and relocation identified in Question Three
occur, how many homes, families, and businesses will be relocated?;
7. If displacement and relocation occur, how many opportunities
will there be for displaced residents to occupy space in the new
251
development as a home or as a small business?;
8. If there is no plan to have displaced residents occupy space in
the new development as a home or as a small business, what
proposals do the relevant government entities have to relocate
residents or small business owners to an equivalent site?;
9.
What is the economic impact of the displacement of these
homes, families, and businesses on the city and state’s purse, in the
form of lost real property and sales taxes, jobs generated by small

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Housing provisions in the new development plan for some of the displaced
residents in Berman v. Parker were specifically noted by the Court in that case. 348
U.S. 26, 30-31 (1954). At least one-third of the new residential units were to be “lowrent housing with a maximum rent of $17 per room per month.” Id.
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businesses that may be displaced, and revenues generated by these
businesses?;
10.
What is the ethnic and racial breakdown of the families who
may be displaced?;
11.
What is the promised economic impact of the takings, in
terms of employment opportunities and tax revenue gained?;
12.
Is the promised economic impact referred to in Question
Eleven realistic and practical, in light of other potentially
uncontrollable factors, such as the availability of financing for the
project, key tenants and institutions that may occupy the project, or
the economic health of these key tenants?;
13.
What ties, if any, do the private entities that stand to gain
from the economic development project have with any state or
local governments exercising eminent domain or promulgating
legislation in support of its exercise?; and
14. What alternatives exist to placing the economic development
252
project in the proposed site?

There is no reason, however, that SCIAs could not be expanded to
go beyond economic development takings and to provide a global
statutory solution to takings in general, especially those by private,
non-profit actors delegated this power. Statutorily implemented
SCIAs would likely address the major concerns of the Private NonDelegation Doctrine and the Texas Boll Weevil test by essentially
injecting public input and, consequently, a process of accountability
into the takings decisions of private non-profit delegates. The effect
of this process would be to mitigate any conflicting interests between
the private delegate and the public and to lessen a noxious use of this
power. For instance, in the NEPA/environmental arena, EISs are
253
often made available to public officials for their public comments.
By mandating that SCIAs concerning a private, non-profit entity’s use
of its delegated takings power be provided to pertinent elected
officials, and subsequently providing a forum for officials to respond
and to comment on a non-profit’s proposed action, affected
communities would be afforded a golden opportunity to determine
their representatives’ stance on a proposed taking. Communities
could then subsequently decide their agreement with this stance on
Election Day. At a minimum, however, this Article recommends that
SCIAs be included as part of the “record” before elected officials or
252. Johnson, supra note 241.
253. See Caldwell, supra note 246, at 207; see also MacMillan, supra note 243, at 51920.
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before advisory groups to elected officials that have final say over a
non-profit’s exercise of the takings power.
CONCLUSION
In an era in which many services are privatized by government,
from prisons to war, it is no surprise that the privatization movement
would inevitably extend to the traditionally governmental, very public
and coercive power of eminent domain. Having escaped the harsh
scrutiny that followed the Court’s Kelo decision and that upheld
economic development takings that benefit for-profit private parties,
takings by private, non-profit and charitable corporations merit equal
concern nonetheless. These entities often operate in the shadows of
governmental and electoral oversight and are largely governed by
privately shielded boards of directors.
This Article advocates that state renderings of the Private NonDelegation Doctrine, a doctrine that remains alive and well in state
courts and that is based upon fundamental notions of accountability
to the electorate, especially when interests of a private delegate may
diverge from those of the public, provide an excellent legal and
constitutional basis for assessing the delegation of the takings power
by private non-profit corporations.
Moreover, the Texas Boll Weevil, a test used by the Texas Supreme
Court to evaluate private delegations of power may serve as a model
for analyzing private delegations of public power in general, but in
particular delegations of the taking power to private non-profit or
charitable corporations. Two examples of private non-profit or
charitable corporations, the Dudley Neighborhood Initiative, Inc. in
Boston, Massachusetts, and the Texas Medical Center in Houston,
Texas, that have been delegated eminent domain power are put to
the modified and original versions of the Texas Boll Weevil test. The
result is one that illustrates that the two cases occupy opposite
constitutional poles under their respective state Private NonDelegation Doctrines.
As a way to ensure that unconstitutional delegations of the eminent
domain power to private non-profit or charitable corporations survive
state constitutional scrutiny under the Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine, this Article advocates a number of statutory regimes for
these types of delegation. Short of establishing a per se rule against
the delegation of eminent domain to private, non-profit
corporations, these statutory solutions, in a time where privatization
is a popular panacea for a number of ills, may provide a
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constitutional cure under the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine when
the very public power of eminent domain is delegated to
unaccountable private non-profit corporations.

